2022 (1) TMI 1491 - HC - Indian Laws

Petition allowed: Disciplinary committee violated Section 4 of Sexual Harassment Act 2013; summary trial held unlawful

HC allowed the petition, holding the disciplinary committee constituted by the school did not meet the mandatory requirements of Section 4 of the Sexual ... Validity of order of suspension inflicted upon the petitioner - committee constituted for summary trial pertaining to the allegations of sexual harassment against the petitioner has statutory force after enactment of The Sexual harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 or not - Permission to applicant to join his duties as TGT at Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Ravangla, South Sikkim - withdrawal of decision of the respondent no. 2 to conduct summary trial into the allegation against the applicant - withdrawal of order of suspension and the subsequent orders of extension - HELD THAT:- The legal scenario as to dealing with the complaints of sexual harassment at workplace has undergone a sea-change after the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vishaka –Vs - State of Rajasthan [1997 (8) TMI 456 - SUPREME COURT] and after enactment of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. In the decision in Vishaka the Hon’ble Apex Court directed that every organisation public or private shall have to constitute an internal complaints committee to enquire into any complaint of sexual harassment made by any aggrieved woman. In a later decision in the case of Medha Kotwal Lele and Others-Vs- Union of India and Ors [2012 (10) TMI 1269 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon’ble Supreme Court further passed the similar directive as to formation of internal complaints committee at every workplace. It is axiomatic that the committee so formed by the respondent school authorities cannot be termed as an internal complaints committee as envisaged under the provisions of Section 4 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. Though the committee was constituted in terms of the notification dated 20.12.1993 issued by Navadaya Vidyalaya Samiti, but, the committee dehors of the fundamental legal requirements under Section 4 of the Act, has now lost its statutory force - the definition of ‘aggrieved woman’ as defined under Section 2 (a) of the Act may be referred. As per Section 2 (a) an aggrieved woman means in relation to a workplace, a woman, of any age whether employed or not, who alleges to have been subjected to any act of sexual harassment by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of the Act squarely apply to the students of the school. The committee constituted for summary trial without adhering to the mandatory requirements of the law and the rules as quoted above loses its legal force. Therefore, viewed from all aspects, the impugned order passed by the Learned Tribunal holding the legality of the committee for summary trial is not sustainable in law. Therefore, in view of the observations as above, the question as raised for resolution is answered in the negative - Petition allowed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether the order of suspension passed while the employee was detained for less than forty-eight hours contravenes Rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and is therefore illegal ab initio. 2. Whether continuing suspension beyond a reasonable period (exceeding 90 days) without service of a memorandum of charges/charge-sheet and without contemporaneous reasoned justification is vitiated by law. 3. Whether a committee constituted for 'summary trial' under a pre-existing administrative notification retains statutory force to inquire into allegations of sexual harassment after the enactment of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and consequent amendments to Central Civil Services rules. 4. Whether complaints of sexual harassment made by girl students fall within the scope of the 2013 Act (i.e., whether students qualify as 'aggrieved woman') and thus attract the Act's mandatory internal complaints committee (ICC) machinery. 5. Whether, after the 2013 Act and the amendments to service rules (Rule 3C Conduct Rules and amended Rule 14 CCS CCA Rules), an ICC is to be treated as the inquiring authority for purposes of disciplinary proceedings in service rules and whether a summary-trial committee not constituted in terms of Section 4/Rule 3C/Rule 14 is legally effective. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Legality of suspension effected during detention shorter than 48 hours (Rule 10(2) CCS CCA Rules) Legal framework: Rule 10(2)(a) CCS CCA Rules provides that a government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of detention if detained in custody for a period exceeding forty-eight hours. Precedent treatment: The Court applied the Rule as written and considered surrounding jurisprudence on suspension duration (see Issue 2 analysis). Interpretation and reasoning: Suspension effected within 24 hours of detention (i.e., before the 48-hour threshold) does not meet the statutory condition in Rule 10(2)(a) for deemed suspension. The suspension order therefore contravened the clear textual provision and is illegal ab initio. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - suspension during detention for less than 48 hours violates Rule 10(2)(a) and is unlawful. Conclusion: The initial suspension order was unsustainable in law to the extent it relied on Rule 10(2)(a) while detention had not exceeded forty-eight hours. Issue 2 - Legality of protracted suspension exceeding 90 days without charge-sheet or contemporaneous reasons Legal framework: Principles limiting the permissible duration of suspension and requiring prompt formulation of charges and reasoned extensions govern administrative law and disciplinary regimes. Precedent Treatment: The Court relied on the principle that suspension is transitory and must be of short duration; prolonged or repeated renewals without contemporaneous reasoning render it punitive (as encapsulated in leading authority directing that suspension currency should not extend beyond three months absent service of charges/charge-sheet or contemporaneous reasons). Interpretation and reasoning: The petitioner remained suspended for over 100 days without service of a chargesheet and without reasoned, contemporaneous justification for extensions. The appellate remedy under Rule 23 remained unaddressed. Such protraction converts suspension from protective to punitive and violates the principles established by the cited precedent. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - suspension extending beyond the prescribed/accepted short period without service of charges/charge-sheet and without contemporaneous reasoned orders is vitiated. Conclusion: Extensions of suspension in the case were illegal and liable to be quashed for want of compliance with the requirement of prompt action and reasoned justification. Issue 3 - Validity of pre-existing 'summary trial' committee after enactment of the 2013 Act and amendments to service rules Legal framework: The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (the Act) mandates constitution and composition of Internal Complaints Committees (Section 4) with an independent member from NGOs or persons familiar with sexual harassment issues; Section 11 directs that where the respondent is an employee the ICC shall proceed to make inquiry in accordance with applicable service rules. Amended Rule 14 CCS CCA Rules deems complaints committees constituted under the Act to be the inquiring authority for disciplinary purposes. Precedent Treatment: Earlier administrative notifications constituting summary trial committees were upheld historically, but the Court distinguished that precedent in light of the statutory regime introduced by the 2013 Act and subsequent rule amendments which now occupy the field. Interpretation and reasoning: A committee constituted under an administrative notification predating the Act that does not satisfy the mandatory composition and independence requirements of Section 4 (notably lack of an external/NGO member) and does not conform to the amended service-rule mandate (Rule 14) has lost statutory force. The Act and amended rules supersede inconsistent earlier arrangements insofar as complaints of sexual harassment are concerned. The composition of the summary trial committee in the instant matter lacked the independent/NGO member and other statutory hallmarks, and therefore cannot be treated as the ICC or as a valid inquiring authority under Rule 14. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - post-2013, committees not constituted in conformity with Section 4 and amended Rule 14 are not competent to entertain or decide sexual harassment complaints against employees; such committees have no statutory force to act as inquiring authorities for that purpose. Conclusion: The summary-trial committee constituted under the pre-2013 notification, lacking required statutory composition and independence, lost legal efficacy after the 2013 Act and amendments; the Tribunal's view upholding its legality was unsustainable. Issue 4 - Applicability of the 2013 Act to complaints made by students (definition of 'aggrieved woman') Legal framework: Section 2(a) of the Act defines 'aggrieved woman' as a woman of any age whether employed or not who alleges to have been subjected to sexual harassment at the workplace. Precedent Treatment: The Court applied the Act's definition; earlier case law (Vishaka; Medha Kotwal Lele) established mandatory ICC formation and protections; more recent authority emphasises independent NGO member to avoid institutional bias. Interpretation and reasoning: The statutory definition explicitly includes women 'whether employed or not,' thereby covering students who are women at the workplace. Therefore complaints by girl students fall squarely within the Act's ambit and require the statutory ICC mechanism. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - complaints by students qualify as complaints by 'aggrieved woman' under the Act; the Act applies. Conclusion: The 2013 Act applies to allegations made by girl students; the institution was bound to implement the ICC machinery prescribed by the Act. Issue 5 - Effect of Section 11 and amended Rule 14 (CCS CCA) making ICC the inquiring authority and consequence for non-compliant summary proceedings Legal framework: Section 11 of the Act mandates that where respondent is an employee the ICC shall make inquiry in accordance with service rules; amended Rule 14 CCS CCA Rules deems complaints committees constituted under Rule 3C/Section 4 to be the inquiring authority and prescribes that their enquiry should, as far as practicable, follow CCS CCA procedure. Precedent Treatment: The Court relied upon subsequent Supreme Court guidance directing independence of ICCs (including appointment of NGO/non-government member) to avoid institutional bias. Interpretation and reasoning: The legislative and rule amendments integrate the ICC into the disciplinary process; a separate summary-trial mechanism not constituted or operating in conformity with Section 4/Rule 14 cannot be treated as the inquiring authority. The impugned summary-trial order thus failed to comply with mandatory statutory procedure and applicable service rules and is void. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - ICC constituted and operating under the Act and amended service rules is the proper inquiring authority for sexual harassment complaints against employees; any departure deprives proceedings of statutory validity. Conclusion: The summary-trial process undertaken by the committee not constituted under Section 4/Rule 14 is without legal force and was rightly set aside. Remedial Conclusions and Directions (Consequential to Findings) 1. Orders of suspension and successive extensions quashed for non-compliance with Rule 10(2)(a) and for protracted duration without charges and reasoned extension. 2. The summary-trial committee constituted outside the statutory framework is quashed; the Act's ICC mechanism and the amended service-rule regime govern future action on sexual-harassment complaints. 3. The employee is to be allowed to resume duties within a stipulated period and to be paid back wages, reflecting the remedial consequence of quashing unlawful suspension. Cross-References Issues 1 and 2 are interlinked: illegality of initial suspension (Issue 1) and illegality of prolonged suspension without charges (Issue 2) together justify quashing suspension and ordering reinstatement with back wages. Issues 3-5 are interrelated: the statutory framework (Issue 5) and definitional reach of the Act (Issue 4) render pre-existing summary-trial committees (Issue 3) legally ineffective for sexual-harassment complaints, requiring reliance on ICCs constituted under Section 4 and Rule 14.