Specific performance suit not treated as a suit for land where reliefs remained personal and ancillary.

A suit for specific performance of an agreement to convey land is not, by itself, a suit for land unless the plaint or reliefs necessarily seek possession or other direct relief in relation to the land. Here, the plaintiff's assertion of existing possession, the ancillary personal injunction against the defendants, and the prayer to declare a later agreement void and cancel it were treated as personal and instrument-focused reliefs rather than claims to title, possession, control or management of the land. On that footing, the suit was not primarily one for land, so leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was not liable to be revoked.

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Issues: Whether the suit, on its plaint averments and the reliefs claimed, was a suit for land so as to justify revocation of leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

Analysis: The relief for specific performance was examined in the context of the agreement pleaded in the plaint and the plaintiff's assertion that it was already in possession. A decree for specific performance of an agreement to convey land is not, by itself, a suit for land, unless the agreement or the relief sought necessarily includes a claim to possession or other direct relief in relation to the land. The injunction sought was only against the defendants personally and was ancillary to the main relief. The prayer for declaration that the later agreement was void and for its cancellation was also treated as personal relief directed at the instrument and not as a direct claim to title, possession, control or management of the land. On that footing, the suit was not primarily one for land.

Conclusion: The suit was not a suit for land and leave under Clause 12 was not liable to be revoked.

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