Condonation of delay turns on sufficient cause and bona fide explanation, not the length of delay alone.

A delay application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be judged by whether the applicant has shown sufficient cause through a bona fide and acceptable explanation, not by the mere length of delay. Where the record supported the appellant's claim that it had engaged counsel, lacked knowledge of the ex parte decree, and the respondent's letter was received by a former employee who had already left service, the explanation was found credible and there was no indication of mala fides or a dilatory tactic. The refusal to condone the 1932-day delay was therefore unsustainable, the order was set aside, and condonation was granted.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 1932 days in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree was satisfactorily explained and deserved condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Analysis: The explanation offered by the appellant was that it had engaged counsel, believed its interests were protected, and had no knowledge of the ex parte decree until receipt of the respondent's letter. The record showed that the letter was acknowledged by an erstwhile employee who had already left service, and the appellant had produced supporting material to show his cessation from employment. The explanation did not indicate mala fides or a dilatory strategy. In matters of condonation, the length of delay is not decisive by itself and the governing test is the acceptability of the explanation and whether sufficient cause is shown. A liberal approach is required where negligence or want of bona fides is not attributable to the applicant.

Conclusion: The delay was satisfactorily explained and the refusal to condone it was unsustainable. The order declining condonation was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: For condonation of delay, the decisive test is whether sufficient cause is shown by a bona fide and acceptable explanation, not the mere length of delay; where mala fides and negligence are absent, a liberal exercise of discretion is warranted.

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