Criminal revision limitation runs from the Magistrate's order; subordinate revisional time is not excluded, though delay may be condoned.

Article 131 of the Limitation Act was held to run from the Magistrate's operative order in a criminal revision, not from a later refusal by the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate to make a reference, because that subordinate order is not the order under challenge. Time spent before the subordinate revisional forum was not excludable in computing the ninety-day period, as no statutory basis existed for extending limitation by practice. The High Court's revisional power under Section 439 remained available in exceptional cases to prevent injustice, and delay could be condoned where the litigant was misled by prevailing practice and acted diligently.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether, for purposes of Article 131 of the Limitation Act, the period of ninety days in a criminal revision is to be counted from the Magistrate's order or from the order of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate refusing to make a reference to the High Court; (ii) whether the time spent in prosecuting revision before the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate can be excluded in computing limitation; (iii) whether, after expiry of the statutory period, the High Court can still interfere under its revisional powers in exceptional circumstances and whether delay can be condoned where the litigant followed the prevailing practice.

Issue (i): Whether, for purposes of Article 131 of the Limitation Act, the period of ninety days in a criminal revision is to be counted from the Magistrate's order or from the order of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate refusing to make a reference to the High Court.

Analysis: The revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure is exercised in relation to the correctness, legality, or propriety of the inferior criminal court's order. The order that directly affects the party in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code is the Magistrate's order deciding possession. An order of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate under Section 438 is only a report or reference and is not the final order sought to be revised. Treating the subordinate court's refusal to refer as the starting point would create an artificial and anomalous double period of limitation, which the statutory scheme does not contemplate.

Conclusion: The limitation period runs from the date of the Magistrate's order, not from the later order of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate refusing reference.

Issue (ii): Whether the time spent in prosecuting revision before the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate can be excluded in computing limitation.

Analysis: The Limitation Act, as then in force, contained no provision excluding time spent bona fide in prosecuting a criminal revision before a subordinate revisional forum. The court declined to treat the pendency of such proceedings as extending the statutory period, observing that such exclusion could not be introduced by practice when the legislature had fixed the period by statute. The earlier practice of the court could not override the statutory command of Article 131.

Conclusion: The time spent before the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate cannot be excluded in computing the ninety-day period.

Issue (iii): Whether, after expiry of the statutory period, the High Court can still interfere under its revisional powers in exceptional circumstances and whether delay can be condoned where the litigant followed the prevailing practice.

Analysis: The High Court's revisional power under Section 439 is wide and may be exercised suo motu where an illegal or improper order of a subordinate criminal court has caused injustice. A statutory limitation for party-initiated revision does not abolish that power. Where, however, a litigant was misled by the prevailing practice of first approaching the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, delay in approaching the High Court may be a sufficient cause for condonation, and the court should exercise that discretion liberally if the litigant acted promptly and diligently below.

Conclusion: The High Court may interfere in exceptional cases notwithstanding expiry of limitation, and delay may be condoned where sufficient cause is shown, especially when the litigant followed the court's practice.

Final Conclusion: The court settled the law on criminal revision limitation, upheld the Magistrate as the operative order for limitation purposes, refused exclusion of time spent before the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, and nevertheless condoned delay and granted limited reliefs in the two revisions on the facts.

Ratio Decidendi: In criminal revision, limitation under Article 131 runs from the Magistrate's operative order, time spent before a subordinate revisional authority is not automatically excluded, and the High Court's inherent revisional power remains available in exceptional cases to prevent injustice.

---