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Issues: Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the cognizance order were liable to be set aside on the ground that the complaint was filed before expiry of the statutory period after notice.
Analysis: Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 requires the drawer to fail to make payment within fifteen days of receipt of the notice before an offence can be treated as complete. A complaint filed before that period elapses does not disclose the cause of action and cannot sustain cognizance. The question of deemed service and the presumption arising from postal dispatch was distinguished on the facts, because the controlling point here was the premature institution of the complaint rather than denial of service. The cognizance order was also found to be a mechanical format order showing non-application of judicial mind.
Conclusion: The complaint was premature and the cognizance order was unsustainable; it was set aside in favour of the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The criminal proceeding founded on the impugned complaint could not continue, though the complainant was left at liberty to pursue a fresh complaint in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed before expiry of the statutory fifteen-day period after notice does not disclose a complete cause of action, and cognizance taken on such a complaint is barred in law.