Criminal complaint procedure in customs cases requires cognizance and proper enquiry before summons, with discharge available only at the proper stage.

Proceedings under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act were treated as a warrant case otherwise than on police report, so the procedure under Sections 200 to 204 and 244 to 245 of the CrPC applied. The court read the phrase "at any previous stage of the case" in Section 245(2) as referring to a stage after cognizance has been taken and the judicial process has properly commenced. On the stated facts, the Magistrate had not followed the required complaint procedure before issuing summons, and the proceedings were therefore held unsustainable and liable to be quashed, leaving the petitioners free to seek discharge at the appropriate stage.

---

---

Issues: Whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed where the Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons in a warrant case under the Customs Act without recording the complainant's statements or conducting the enquiry contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether discharge under Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was available at that stage.

Analysis: The complaint concerned an offence punishable under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, which was treated as a warrant case otherwise than on police report. The governing procedure was therefore held to be that under Sections 200 to 204 and 244 to 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The expression 'at any previous stage of the case' in Section 245(2) was read as a stage after cognizance has been taken and the case has entered the judicial process contemplated by those provisions. The Magistrate's power to discharge at an earlier stage does not extend to a situation where, on the court's view of the record, the proceedings had not properly commenced beyond receipt of the complaint and no authoritative judicial notice of the allegations had been taken in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The impugned proceedings could not be sustained and were liable to be quashed. The petitioners were left at liberty to pursue discharge in accordance with law at the appropriate stage.

---