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Issues: (i) Whether the expression "entertain" in Section 9(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 means only the initial taking up of an application for consideration or extends until final pronouncement of order. (ii) Whether, where a Section 9 application had already been fully heard and reserved for orders before constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the court was bound to relegate the parties to Section 17 and consider the efficacy of that remedy.
Issue (i): Whether the expression "entertain" in Section 9(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 means only the initial taking up of an application for consideration or extends until final pronouncement of order.
Analysis: The expression "entertain" in Section 9(3) was construed in its settled legal sense as meaning to take up a matter for consideration and apply judicial mind to it. The bar under Section 9(3) is triggered at the stage when the court is called upon to consider a Section 9 application after the tribunal has been constituted. Once the court has begun considering the application, the process of adjudication may continue; the provision does not require a matter already taken up for consideration to be treated as unentertained merely because judgment has not yet been pronounced.
Conclusion: "Entertain" means taking up the application for consideration, not merely the act of pronouncing the final order.
Issue (ii): Whether, where a Section 9 application had already been fully heard and reserved for orders before constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the court was bound to relegate the parties to Section 17 and consider the efficacy of that remedy.
Analysis: Section 9(3) limits fresh entertainment of Section 9 applications after constitution of the tribunal, subject to the exception of inefficacy of the Section 17 remedy. That inquiry is relevant when the court is deciding whether to entertain a new Section 9 request. It is not intended to unsettle an application that had already been heard on merits and reserved for orders before the tribunal came into existence. The statute was not meant to send such matters back to the tribunal at the stage of final orders, especially where the court had already applied its mind to the request for interim relief.
Conclusion: The court was not required to re-examine the Section 17 remedy, and the pending Section 9 applications could proceed to final adjudication.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the limited extent of clarifying the scope of Section 9(3), while leaving the direction to complete adjudication of the pending interim applications undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: The bar in Section 9(3) operates only at the stage of entertaining a Section 9 application after constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and it does not require a court to stop adjudication of an application already entertained and heard on merits before the tribunal was constituted.