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Issues: (i) whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when part of the cause of action arose at Gwalior; (ii) whether the writ petition was barred by the availability of an alternative statutory appeal under Section 22G of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949; (iii) whether the disciplinary order sustaining the finding of professional misconduct could stand when the proceeding was continued despite withdrawal of the complaint and without adequate observance of natural justice and proof.
Issue (i): whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when part of the cause of action arose at Gwalior.
Analysis: Territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 depends on whether the cause of action, wholly or in part, arose within the Court's territory. The material facts connected with the complaint, the petitioner's residence and professional establishment, and the locus of the alleged conduct were all at Gwalior. The mere fact that the disciplinary committee functioned from New Delhi did not exclude jurisdiction where a part of the cause of action had arisen locally.
Conclusion: The objection to territorial jurisdiction was rejected and the writ petition was held maintainable on that ground.
Issue (ii): whether the writ petition was barred by the availability of an alternative statutory appeal under Section 22G of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.
Analysis: The existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction. Where violation of natural justice is alleged, or where the impugned action is without jurisdiction or otherwise fundamentally flawed, the High Court may still entertain the petition. The grievance here was that the disciplinary process proceeded without fair opportunity and in breach of basic procedural fairness, which brought the case within the recognised exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy.
Conclusion: The alternative remedy objection was overruled and the writ petition was treated as maintainable.
Issue (iii): whether the disciplinary order sustaining the finding of professional misconduct could stand when the proceeding was continued despite withdrawal of the complaint and without adequate observance of natural justice and proof.
Analysis: The disciplinary finding rested on conjectures of possible collusion and on material treated as suggesting substantial interest, rather than on firm proof. The complaint had also been sought to be withdrawn, yet the proceedings were continued. Professional misconduct proceedings are of a serious quasi-criminal character and require strict proof, not mere preponderance of probability. In the absence of reliable material and with procedural unfairness in the conduct of the inquiry, the impugned order could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The finding of guilt and the disciplinary order were set aside in favour of the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, the preliminary objections failed, and the disciplinary action was quashed for want of lawful basis and fair procedure.
Ratio Decidendi: In disciplinary proceedings of a quasi-criminal character, findings of professional misconduct must rest on strict proof and observance of natural justice, and a writ court may intervene where part of the cause of action arises within its territory notwithstanding an alternative statutory remedy.