Statutory independence of the CBI Director cannot be bypassed by indirect divestment or implied general powers.

Statutory safeguards protecting the CBI Director's independence were construed broadly: any administrative action that effectively removed, disabled, or curtailed the Director's functioning required prior consideration by the designated Committee under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. An order divesting the Director of powers without that approval was therefore invalid, and the General Clauses Act could not be used to imply a power that would defeat the specific legislative scheme. The result was quashing of the impugned administrative orders, with any fresh consideration of divestment left to the statutory Committee in accordance with law.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Central Vigilance Commission and the Central Government could divest the Director of the CBI of his powers, functions, duties and supervisory role without the previous consent of the Committee under section 4A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; (ii) Whether the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to sustain such divestment and the appointment of an acting Director.

Issue (i): Whether the Central Vigilance Commission and the Central Government could divest the Director of the CBI of his powers, functions, duties and supervisory role without the previous consent of the Committee under section 4A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.

Analysis: The statutory scheme, read in the light of the directions in Vineet Narain and the legislative objective of insulating the office of Director, CBI from extraneous influence, showed that section 4B(2) was intended to protect not only formal transfer but also any action that effectively removed the Director from office or curtailed his functioning. An interpretation confined to ordinary transfer would defeat the purpose of the enactment and allow the authority to disable the Director by indirect means. The Court held that any such intervention affecting the Director's continuance and functioning had to be placed before the Committee under section 4A(1), whose opinion provided the necessary safeguard for independence and public interest.

Conclusion: The impugned divestment orders were invalid for want of prior consent of the Committee and were set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to sustain such divestment and the appointment of an acting Director.

Analysis: The Court held that the provisions of the General Clauses Act could not override the clear legislative intent emerging from sections 4A and 4B of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Since the statute itself occupied the field and indicated a contrary intention, no implied ancillary power could be used to justify interim divestment or substitution of the Director.

Conclusion: The General Clauses Act did not authorise the impugned action.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded and the impugned administrative orders were quashed, while the question of divestment of powers was left to be considered afresh by the statutory Committee in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute is enacted to protect institutional independence and requires prior approval of a designated committee for transfer of the incumbent, that safeguard cannot be bypassed by any action that has the same effect as removal or disabling of the office-holder, and an implied general power cannot override the specific statutory scheme.

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