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Issues: (i) Whether, after a prima facie direction under section 26(1), the Director General could investigate persons not specifically named in the initial order; (ii) whether the refusal to recall the prima facie order on grounds of fraud, mala fides and res judicata warranted interference; (iii) whether rejection of the request for cross-examination was valid; and (iv) whether notice to officers under section 48 could be issued before a final finding against the company.
Issue (i): Whether, after a prima facie direction under section 26(1), the Director General could investigate persons not specifically named in the initial order.
Analysis: The statutory scheme treats the section 26(1) direction as an administrative step taken on a prima facie view, not a final adjudication. The Court held that the Commission need not identify every potential party at the threshold and that the Director General's inquiry may uncover additional facts and persons involved in the same anti-competitive conduct. The breadth of the expression "the matter" in section 26(1), together with the Supreme Court's exposition on the investigative scope of the Director General, supported inclusion of other parties discovered during investigation.
Conclusion: The challenge to the Director General's jurisdiction failed.
Issue (ii): Whether the refusal to recall the prima facie order on grounds of fraud, mala fides and res judicata warranted interference.
Analysis: The Court held that the recall power, even if available in a narrow and exceptional sense, could not be used as a substitute for objections to the merits after the investigation report had been filed. Allegations of fraud and suppression raised disputed questions of fact that required examination on merits before the Commission. The plea of res judicata was also rejected because competition proceedings concerning anti-competitive market conduct may not be concluded by reference to isolated earlier complaints in the manner suggested by the appellant.
Conclusion: Refusal to recall the order was upheld.
Issue (iii): Whether rejection of the request for cross-examination was valid.
Analysis: Regulation 41(5) confers a discretion to permit cross-examination where it is necessary or expedient, and that discretion must be exercised judicially. The Court found that the reasons recorded by the Commission were insufficient because the request could not be rejected merely on the ground that the statements were not relied upon in the report. Cross-examination is relevant not only to impeach reliance but also to test credibility and the value of the evidence.
Conclusion: The refusal to grant cross-examination was set aside.
Issue (iv): Whether notice to officers under section 48 could be issued before a final finding against the company.
Analysis: The Court held that section 48 permits proceedings against persons in charge of the company in the same proceeding and does not require a prior final finding against the company before notice is issued. The provision creates a mode of vicarious liability tied to the company's contravention, and the officers may contest their liability in the same inquiry. The interpretation adopted by the Commission was therefore consistent with the scheme of the Act.
Conclusion: The challenge to notice under section 48 failed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the limited extent of directing the Commission to afford cross-examination to the named witnesses, while the rest of the challenge to the investigation, recall refusal, and section 48 proceedings was rejected.
Ratio Decidendi: A prima facie direction under section 26(1) authorises a broad inquiry into the matter and related persons discovered in investigation, but discretion to deny cross-examination must be exercised on relevant judicial grounds and not by a bare assertion that the evidence is not relied upon.