Distinct statutory remedies and limitation periods under income-tax law do not violate equality when each serves a separate purpose.

Sections 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and 147(b) of the 1961 Act operate in distinct fields: section 35 corrects an error apparent on the record, while section 147(b) addresses escaped income on satisfaction of its statutory preconditions. The availability of both remedies did not create article 14 discrimination, the absence of a separate appeal against rectification under section 35 was not unconstitutional where the amended assessment remained appealable, and the different limitation periods were valid because they were tied to different statutory purposes. The article accordingly states that the constitutional challenge failed and the rectification scheme was upheld as valid.

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Issues: (i) Whether action under section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was discriminatory and violative of article 14 because action could also have been taken under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the absence of a specific appeal against rectification under section 35 created unconstitutional discrimination; (iii) Whether the different limitation periods under the two provisions resulted in hostile discrimination.

Issue (i): Whether action under section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was discriminatory and violative of article 14 because action could also have been taken under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 147(b) applies where income has escaped assessment and is triggered only when the statutory preconditions for reassessment exist. Section 35 operates where there is an error apparent on the record and is directed to rectification of that error. The two provisions therefore operate in distinct fields, with different purposes and scopes. The availability of two remedies does not by itself create discrimination when the statutes are aimed at different situations and no unguided choice between identical procedures is shown.

Conclusion: The challenge under article 14 on this ground fails; action under section 35 was not discriminatory.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of a specific appeal against rectification under section 35 created unconstitutional discrimination.

Analysis: An order under section 35 amends the assessment only to correct an apparent mistake. Once the assessment is amended, the result is treated as a fresh assessment order against which appeal is available. In any event, the absence of a separate appeal against refusal to rectify does not by itself cause prejudice where the original order remains appealable and the statutory scheme is confined to correction of an obvious mistake.

Conclusion: The absence of a separate appeal did not render section 35 unconstitutional.

Issue (iii): Whether the different limitation periods under the two provisions resulted in hostile discrimination.

Analysis: The limitation under section 147(b) runs from the end of the relevant assessment year because it concerns escaped income for that year, whereas the limitation under section 35 runs from the date of the order because it concerns rectification of that order. The two time-limits are therefore anchored to different statutory purposes. A comparison of the periods as if they were interchangeable is impermissible, and the existence of different limitation periods applicable to all persons equally does not amount to hostile discrimination.

Conclusion: The difference in limitation periods did not violate article 14.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition could not be sustained, and the appellate challenge to the single judge's view succeeded because the rectification under section 35 was upheld as constitutionally valid.

Ratio Decidendi: Where two statutory provisions operate in distinct fields and are triggered by different conditions and purposes, the mere availability of both does not offend article 14 merely because one remedy may be more or less onerous or may carry a different limitation scheme.

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