Reassessment cannot rest on a mere change of opinion; fresh material is required before reopening completed tax assessments.

Reassessment under Section 31 of the Bihar Value Added Tax Act cannot rest on a mere later judicial ruling alone; the prescribed authority must have reasonable grounds based on fresh material, and reopening on a pure change of opinion is impermissible. On that basis, proceedings founded only on the Supreme Court's later view on mobile phone chargers were quashed where assessment or reassessment had already been completed. In the remaining matters, disputed questions on liability and classification made the statutory appellate remedy more appropriate, so writ interference was declined and the petitioners were relegated to the appeal mechanism.

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Issues: (i) Whether reassessment under Section 31 of the Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005 could be initiated merely on the basis of the Supreme Court's later decision on mobile phone chargers, without any new material and in the absence of concealment or failure to disclose full and correct particulars. (ii) Whether writ relief should be declined where the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy and the matter involved disputed questions of fact.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment under Section 31 of the Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005 could be initiated merely on the basis of the Supreme Court's later decision on mobile phone chargers, without any new material and in the absence of concealment or failure to disclose full and correct particulars.

Analysis: Section 31 was read as permitting reassessment only where the prescribed authority has reasonable grounds to believe that turnover has escaped assessment, been under-assessed, or assessed at a lower rate. The Court held that the provision, read harmoniously with its penalty clause, contemplates reassessment in cases both with and without concealment, but even then the jurisdictional condition of reasonable belief must be satisfied. Applying the principle against mere change of opinion, the Court held that a subsequent judicial pronouncement by itself does not supply fresh material for reopening an assessment that had already been completed on the existing legal position. In the cases where prior assessments or reassessments had already been made, the notices were founded only on the later Supreme Court ruling and no independent material had emerged.

Conclusion: Reassessment on that basis alone was impermissible and the impugned proceedings were quashed in the matters where prior assessment or reassessment had already occurred.

Issue (ii): Whether writ relief should be declined where the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy and the matter involved disputed questions of fact.

Analysis: For the remaining matters, the returns had been treated as deemed assessments or assessments under the statutory scheme, and the Court found that factual issues regarding liability and classification required examination by the statutory authorities. In such circumstances, the existence of an efficacious appellate remedy weighed against interference in writ jurisdiction. The Court therefore declined to entertain those petitions on merits and left the petitioners to pursue the statutory appeal mechanism.

Conclusion: The writ petitions in that category were dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative statutory remedy.

Final Conclusion: The Court granted relief in the petitions where reassessment had been initiated only on a mere change of opinion, but declined writ intervention in the remaining petitions and relegated the petitioners to the statutory appellate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot be founded on a mere change of opinion or on a subsequent judicial declaration alone; a jurisdictional reopening requires reasonable belief supported by fresh material, while writ interference may be refused where disputed facts are better left to the statutory appellate hierarchy.

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