Passport impounding requires authority under the Passports Act; income-tax powers cannot justify retention of a passport.

The Passports Act was treated as the special and complete code governing impounding of passports, so executive retention of a passport without authority under that Act was impermissible. Section 131(3) of the Income-tax Act, which permits impounding and retention of books of account or other documents, was held not to extend to a passport because a passport does not fall within that expression. The distinction between seizure and impounding was emphasised, and the passport's retention by the respondent authorities was found to be without authority of law. Relief under Article 226 was granted on conditions requiring the petitioner's cooperation and disclosure before return of the passport.

---

---

Issues: Whether the respondent authorities had power under the Foreign Exchange Management Act and the Income-tax Act to retain or impound the petitioner's passport, or whether such action could be taken only under the Passports Act.

Analysis: The Passports Act was treated as a special law and a complete code governing impounding of passports. The power under section 131(3) of the Income-tax Act to impound and retain books of account or other documents was held not to extend to a passport, because a passport is not covered by the expression "documents" in that provision. The distinction between seizure and impounding was emphasized, and it was held that retention of a passport by executive authorities without authority under the Passports Act was not permissible. The Court also noted that the relief under Article 226 was discretionary and balanced the equities by requiring cooperation and disclosure from the petitioner before return of the passport.

Conclusion: The impounding and retention of the passport by the respondent authorities was without authority of law and the writ petition was allowed, with a direction to return the passport on compliance with the stated conditions.

---