Condonation of delay in statutory appeals fails without sufficient cause; bureaucratic delay and red tape are not enough.

Limitation governs statutory appeals, and an applicant seeking condonation must establish sufficient cause for the entire delay. Inordinate delay of 337 days was not excused because bureaucratic movement of files, red tape, negligence, inaction, and lack of diligence do not by themselves amount to sufficient cause, including for governmental authorities. A liberal approach to condonation applies only where a plausible and satisfactory explanation exists, which was absent here. The challenge to the arbitral award also disclosed no independent ground for interference, and reliance on a subsequently overruled view of the outer limit for condonation did not assist the applicants because the delay remained otherwise unexplained.

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Issues: Whether the inordinate delay of 337 days in filing the statutory appeal deserved condonation under the law of limitation, and whether the High Court's refusal to interfere with the arbitral award called for interference.

Analysis: The right of appeal is subject to limitation, and the applicant seeking condonation must show sufficient cause explaining the delay. The law of limitation binds governmental authorities as well, and bureaucratic delay, movement of files, or red tape do not by themselves constitute sufficient cause. Although a liberal approach may be adopted where a plausible explanation exists, such liberality cannot be extended to cover inordinate delay caused by negligence, inaction, or lack of diligence. The challenge to the arbitral award also disclosed no ground warranting interference, and the fact that the High Court referred to a subsequently overruled view on the outer limit for condonation did not assist the Petitioners because the delay was otherwise unexplained to the Court's satisfaction.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable and no ground was made out for interference with the High Court's order or the arbitral award.

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