Complaint filed after six months time-barred under Sections 468-469 Cr.P.C, proceedings quashed without sanction exclusion

The HC held that the complaint filed on 12.04.2019 was barred by limitation under Sections 468-469 of Cr.P.C. The respondent had knowledge of the alleged offence on 14.06.2018 when the show cause notice was issued. The court ruled that no prior sanction was required under the Act for prosecution, and administrative permission cannot be equated to statutory consent or sanction under Section 470(3) of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the period for obtaining sanction could not be excluded from the limitation period. Since the complaint was filed after six months, it was time-barred and the proceedings were quashed.

---

---

Issues:
1. Whether the complaint lodged by the respondent is barred by limitationRs.

Analysis:
The petitioners filed a petition to quash the proceedings in E.O.C.C.No. 97 of 2019, which alleged offences under Section 185(2) of the Companies Act, 2013. The respondent's complaint stated that the petitioners' company had made a loan without prior approval, violating Section 185 of the Act. The petitioners argued that the complaint was time-barred, citing Sections 468 & 469 of Cr.P.C. They relied on previous judgments to support their contention, emphasizing the importance of the limitation period in legal proceedings.

In response, the Standing Counsel for the respondent contended that the complaint was not barred by limitation. An inspection under Section 206(5) of the Act revealed non-compliance by the petitioners with Section 185. The respondent issued a show cause notice, followed by the complaint. The Standing Counsel argued that the delay in lodging the complaint was due to the requirement of sanction, as per Section 470 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the complaint was maintainable and not time-barred, urging the dismissal of the petition.

The Court deliberated on whether the complaint was barred by limitation. It noted that there was no provision in the Act requiring prior sanction for prosecution. The respondent's argument of delay due to obtaining sanction was considered. However, since no consent or sanction from the Central Government was necessary to prosecute the petitioners under the Act, the administrative permission obtained could not be equated to statutory consent. As the complaint was filed after the six-month period, it was deemed time-barred. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, quashing the proceedings in E.O.C.C.No. 97 of 2019.

In conclusion, the judgment emphasized the importance of the limitation period in legal proceedings and clarified that administrative permissions do not equate to statutory consent. The Court's decision to quash the proceedings was based on the finding that the complaint was time-barred, as it was not launched within the stipulated period.

---