Limitation for prosecution under the Companies Act cannot be extended by administrative permission; delay after stay was excluded only partly.

Prosecution under the Companies Act was held to be time-barred because the complaint was filed beyond the limitation period after excluding only the time during which a stay order operated. The court noted that delay after the stay was vacated could not be excluded merely on the basis that administrative permission from the Central Government had been sought, because Section 470(3) CrPC applies only where the statute itself requires consent or sanction. An administrative permission to initiate prosecution is not the same as a statutory sanction. As the complaint was not instituted within six months from the date the stay ceased, the proceedings were liable to be quashed.

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Issues: Whether the prosecution for the alleged offences under the Companies Act was barred by limitation, and whether the period taken for obtaining administrative permission from the Central Government could be excluded under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Analysis: The complaint was filed long after the alleged occurrences, and the period during which a stay order remained in force was liable to be excluded while computing limitation. However, the further delay after the stay was vacated could not be excluded merely because administrative permission had been sought from the Central Government. Section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies only where consent or sanction is required under the statute itself; an administrative permission to launch prosecution is not the same as a statutory sanction. As the complaint was not instituted within six months from the date on which the stay was vacated, the prosecution was time-barred.

Conclusion: The prosecution was barred by limitation and the proceedings were liable to be quashed.

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