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Issues: (i) Whether a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable after the revisional jurisdiction had been invoked under Section 397(3) of that Code; (ii) whether persons to whom pardon had been granted in relation to a composite investigation could be treated as approvers in the complaint case and examined under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (i): Whether a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable after the revisional jurisdiction had been invoked under Section 397(3) of that Code.
Analysis: The bar on a second revision does not by itself exclude the exercise of inherent power. The inherent jurisdiction preserved by Section 482 is not curtailed where interference is necessary to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The impugned order was not treated as a mere interlocutory order, and the existence of a prior revision did not defeat maintainability.
Conclusion: The petition was maintainable.
Issue (ii): Whether persons to whom pardon had been granted in relation to a composite investigation could be treated as approvers in the complaint case and examined under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The investigation, report, pardon application, and pardon orders all related to composite allegations covering both the licence-obtaining conspiracy and the subsequent clearance and misutilisation allegations. Where offences arise out of the same transaction and the grant of pardon is linked to the composite matter, the approver status does not vanish merely because two cases are later filed separately. The fact that the complaint had initially proceeded under the procedure for warrant cases did not prevent resort to Section 306. The precise evidence ultimately to be given by the persons granted pardon could not be decided in advance, and their initial qualification as approvers was sufficient.
Conclusion: The persons granted pardon could be treated as approvers in the complaint case, and the procedure under Section 306 of the Code was applicable.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the orders directing treatment of the two persons as approvers in both matters failed, and the complaint proceedings were permitted to proceed in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: Where pardon is granted in relation to a composite investigation covering offences arising from the same transaction, the recipient remains an approver for all such connected offences even if separate proceedings are later instituted, and the High Court may exercise inherent power notwithstanding the revisional bar when necessary to prevent abuse of process.