2007 (1) TMI 650 - HC - Indian Laws

Defamation Charges Quashed for Managing Editor; Not Liable for Day-to-Day Reporting or Defamatory Content.

Vivek Goenka Versus State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Vivek Goenka Versus State of Maharashtra and Ors. - TMI Issues Involved:1. Quashing of process issued under Section 500 read with Section 34 of IPC.2. Responsibility of the Managing Editor for day-to-day reporting.3. Applicability of Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867.4. Applicability of the Fourth Exception to Section 499 of IPC.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Quashing of Process Issued Under Section 500 Read with Section 34 of IPC:The applicant, the Chairman and Managing Editor of the Indian Express Group, sought to quash the process issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pune, in Criminal Case No. 1912 of 1997. The process was issued under Section 500 read with Section 34 of IPC for a defamatory news item published in the Pune Edition of 'Loksatta' on 20/5/1997. The applicant argued that he was not responsible for day-to-day reporting, which was the responsibility of the Resident Editor and the Editor at the corporate level. The applicant relied on Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, which presumes the Editor or Resident Editor responsible for publication. The court noted that the applicant's involvement in day-to-day reporting was not established, and the presumption under Section 7 did not apply to him.2. Responsibility of the Managing Editor for Day-to-Day Reporting:The applicant contended that he, as the Managing Editor, was not responsible for the day-to-day reporting in the local editions of 'Loksatta.' He argued that the Resident Editor and the Editor at the corporate level were responsible for the content published in the newspaper. The court agreed with this contention, noting that the applicant did not have knowledge of the reports published in the local editions and could not be held responsible for the defamatory content. The court referred to the case of K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala (Mathew-I), which established that the person named as Editor or Resident Editor is presumed responsible for the publication.3. Applicability of Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867:Section 7 of the Act presumes that the person whose name is printed as Editor is responsible for the publication. The applicant argued that this presumption should apply to the Resident Editor or Editor, not the Managing Editor. The court referred to the case of K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham (Mathew-II), which clarified that the presumption under Section 7 is rebuttable and can be challenged by leading evidence. However, in this case, the court found no positive averments against the Managing Editor and noted that the accused nos.2 to 4 (Printer, Publisher, and Resident Editor) had accepted their responsibility for the publication on oath.4. Applicability of the Fourth Exception to Section 499 of IPC:The Fourth Exception to Section 499 of IPC states that it is not defamation to publish a substantially true report of court proceedings. The applicant argued that the news item in question was a substantially true version of a suit filed by Ms. Yogeeta Bankar, which included the complainant as a defendant. The court examined the news item and found that the first three paragraphs did not make a case of defamation, while the remaining paragraphs, particularly paragraphs 5 and 6, were alleged to be defamatory. The court noted that the reporting was substantially true and fell within the Fourth Exception to Section 499 of IPC, thus not constituting defamation.Conclusion:The court concluded that the applicant, as the Managing Editor, was not responsible for the day-to-day reporting in the local editions and could not be held liable for the defamatory content published in the Pune Edition of 'Loksatta.' The presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, did not apply to him, and the Fourth Exception to Section 499 of IPC protected the publication as it was a substantially true report of court proceedings. Consequently, the application to quash the process issued against the applicant was allowed, and the rule was made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) for the applicant only. The observations made in the judgment were stated to have no bearing on the pending petitions.