Kerosene definition under control order required proof of the prescribed flame or smoke test standard for prosecution.

Clause 2(f) of the Kerala Kerosene Control Order was treated as incorporating the statutory meaning of kerosene from item 7 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, so later repeal of the source provision did not alter that definition. The Court declined to broaden the clear scientific standard by contextual or purposive interpretation and relied on stare decisis in affirming the earlier view in Kunhimoideenkutty. On that approach, prosecution had to prove that the seized liquid satisfied the prescribed flame or smoke test standard. As that proof was not established beyond reasonable doubt, the convictions could not stand and acquittal followed.

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Issues: Whether, for prosecution under the Kerala Kerosene Control Order, kerosene must be proved by a flame test showing the prescribed flame height, and whether genuine kerosene can be treated as kerosene even if such test was not conducted.

Analysis: Clause 2(f) of the Kerala Kerosene Control Order adopts the meaning assigned to kerosene in item No. 7 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. That definition was treated as incorporated into the Control Order and not as a mere reference, so later repeal of the source provision did not affect the incorporated meaning. The definition was held to be clear and not ambiguous, and the Court declined to expand it by invoking contextual or purposive interpretation so as to ignore the specific scientific standard attached to the commodity. The earlier decision in Kunhimoideenkutty was affirmed, and the long-standing interpretation, left undisturbed by the rule-making authority, was also supported by the doctrine of stare decisis.

Conclusion: The prosecution had to prove that the seized liquid satisfied the statutory definition of kerosene, including the prescribed flame or smoke test standard. Since that was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the convictions could not stand and the appellants were entitled to acquittal.

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