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<h1>Supreme Court Clarifies 'Disposed of' in Section 34 Application under Arbitration Act</h1> <h3>M/s VED PRAKASH MITHAL AND SONS Versus UNION OF INDIA</h3> M/s VED PRAKASH MITHAL AND SONS Versus UNION OF INDIA - TMI Issues:1. Timeliness of Section 34 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.Analysis:The case involved a dispute regarding the timeliness of a Section 34 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. An Arbitral Award was delivered on 30.10.2015 and received by the respondent on 07.11.2015. The respondent filed an application to correct the Award on 16.11.2015, which was later dismissed on 14.12.2015. Subsequently, on 11.03.2016, objections to the Award were filed under Section 34. The Additional District Judge found the application time-barred, stating it should have been made earlier. The High Court, however, reversed this decision, considering the time period for filing the Section 34 application started from the date the Section 33 application was disposed of, i.e., 14.12.2015.The main argument presented was regarding the interpretation of the term 'disposed of' in Section 34(3) of the Act. The petitioner contended that 'disposed of' should be read in conjunction with Section 33, implying that it refers to cases where the Award is corrected or modified. The petitioner relied on a judgment of the Bombay High Court to support this interpretation. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation, emphasizing that Section 34(3) clearly refers to the date on which a request under Section 33 is 'disposed of' by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court clarified that the term 'disposal' can include both allowing or dismissing an application. Therefore, the Court upheld the decision of the Delhi High Court, ruling that the Section 34 application was within the prescribed time limit. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.