Implied consent to voter transport by vehicles was enough to establish corrupt practice and invalidate the election.

Use of mechanically propelled vehicles to transport voters to polling stations was treated as a corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 when the proved facts supported an inference of the returned candidate's implied consent. Repeated jeep and vehicle use across polling dates, including vehicles procured by the candidate, together with the organised role of agents and workers and no steps to stop the practice, distinguished mere knowledge from consent. On that factual pattern, the election was liable to be set aside.

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Issues: Whether the election petition was rightly allowed on the ground that the returned candidate had, by his consent, permitted the use of mechanically propelled vehicles for transporting voters to polling stations, attracting Section 100(1)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Analysis: The proved instances showed repeated use of jeeps and other mechanically propelled vehicles over several polling dates and stations, including an instance where vehicles procured by the returned candidate were used. The finding was not confined to mere knowledge of the acts by his agents; on the facts, the repeated and organised nature of the transport operation, the involvement of agents and workers acting in connection with the election, and the absence of any steps to stop the practice justified an inference that the acts were committed with the candidate's implied consent. The distinction between knowledge and consent was considered, but the conclusion turned on the factual inference of consent drawn from the entire pattern of conduct.

Conclusion: The corrupt practice was established with the returned candidate's implied consent, and the election was liable to be set aside.

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