Speedy trial and personal liberty can justify bail in NDPS cases despite Section 37 restrictions.

Bail under the NDPS Act remains subject to Section 37's twin conditions when sought on merits, but a claim based on prolonged, unexplained trial delay stands on a separate constitutional footing. The right to personal liberty and speedy trial under Articles 14 and 21 cannot be confined to a selective remedy, and the directions in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, as extended, apply to similarly placed undertrials. Those directions are not displaced by Section 436A CrPC. As no special feature showed delay attributable to the accused, bail was found available on the ground of inordinate delay in trial despite Section 37.

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Issues: Whether the restrictions on bail under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 prevent grant of bail on the ground of inordinate delay in trial by applying the directions in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, and whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on that ground.

Analysis: The Court held that bail on merits under the NDPS Act remains controlled by the twin conditions in Section 37, but bail sought because of prolonged and unexplained trial delay stands on a different footing. The right to personal liberty and speedy trial under Articles 14 and 21 cannot be reduced to a selective remedy, and the directions issued in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, as later extended, apply to similarly placed undertrials across the country. The Court further held that those directions are not curtailed by Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and that no special feature showed contributory delay attributable to the petitioner.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to bail on the ground of inordinate delay in trial, and the restrictions in Section 37 did not bar such relief.

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