Consent decree challenges turn on minor status, fraud, and guardian negligence; decree avoided only for the unbound minor.

A consent decree entered in a mortgage matter was held void as against a minor who was not conclusively bound by an earlier age determination made without notice to him. The court held that the age order did not operate as res judicata, and the minor could prove that he was still under age when the compromise was made. A separate suit to impeach the decree for fraud, collusion, and gross negligence of guardians ad litem was maintainable, and the absence of a specific challenge to the final decree did not bar relief. However, the other plaintiffs failed because mere guardian negligence, without proved fraud or collusion, was insufficient to invalidate the compromise for them.

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Issues: (i) Whether the order treating Ganganand as a major barred him from showing that he was still a minor at the time of the consent decree; (ii) Whether the plaintiffs could maintain a separate suit to impeach the consent decree on the grounds of fraud, collusion, and gross negligence of the guardians ad litem; (iii) Whether the plaintiffs were precluded because the final mortgage decree was not specifically attacked; (iv) Whether the consent decree was avoidable against Ganganand on the grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation or estoppel, and whether the decree could be avoided by the other plaintiffs on the ground of gross negligence of the guardians ad litem.

Issue (i): Whether the order treating Ganganand as a major barred him from showing that he was still a minor at the time of the consent decree.

Analysis: The order was passed on a petition filed on the assumption that the guardian ad litem no longer represented Ganganand, and no notice was served on him before the order was made. On that footing, he was not a party to the order. Even if he had remained a minor, the application was made by the guardian on the basis that she no longer represented his interest, so the order could not bind him as a conclusive adjudication of age.

Conclusion: The order did not operate as res judicata against Ganganand, and he was entitled to prove that he was a minor.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiffs could maintain a separate suit to impeach the consent decree on the grounds of fraud, collusion, and gross negligence of the guardians ad litem.

Analysis: A decree obtained by fraud or collusion is liable to be challenged in a properly constituted suit. The pleadings alleged fraud on the minors and not fraud practised on the Court. The situation was materially different from cases where the record disclosed a valid representation on its face and the attack was merely procedural. The evidence of the guardians showed that they did not independently consider the settlement, which supported the complaint of gross negligence, but the legal attack remained one on the validity of the compromise itself.

Conclusion: The separate suit was maintainable in law.

Issue (iii): Whether the plaintiffs were precluded because the final mortgage decree was not specifically attacked.

Analysis: The final decree proceedings did not show that Ganganand was served or that he was a party to them. In any event, the consent decree itself was not a true preliminary decree in the sense of Order XXXIV because it did not direct accounts to be taken in the ordinary manner and was intended to operate as a compromise to be executed upon default. The objection was technical and did not defeat the suit.

Conclusion: The omission to separately attack the final decree did not bar the suit.

Issue (iv): Whether the consent decree was avoidable against Ganganand on the grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation or estoppel, and whether the decree could be avoided by the other plaintiffs on the ground of gross negligence of the guardians ad litem.

Analysis: The evidence established that Ganganand was in fact a minor when the compromise was entered into, and the Indian Majority Act prolonged his minority. His acts in filing pleadings or vakalatnamas did not amount to an express fraudulent representation of age, and fraud required proof of a dishonest state of mind, which was absent. The plea of estoppel also failed because no clear representation or conduct inducing belief in majority was proved. As regards the other plaintiffs, the guardians ad litem acted with serious lack of responsibility, but the compromise was entered into in the context of the karta's management of the joint family and there was no proved fraud or collusion between the Maharaja and the karta. On the proved facts, the guardians' negligence did not warrant setting aside the decree for the plaintiffs other than Ganganand.

Conclusion: Ganganand succeeded and the decree was void as against him, but the other plaintiffs failed to avoid the consent decree.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part: the consent decree was set aside as against Ganganand with an injunction against its execution to that extent, while the challenge by the remaining plaintiffs failed and the suit was restored for further proceedings according to law.

Ratio Decidendi: A consent decree can be avoided where a minor was not effectively bound by it and no fraudulent misrepresentation or estoppel is established against him, but mere negligence of a guardian ad litem without proved fraud or collusion does not by itself invalidate the compromise for other represented parties.

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