Reasoned belief in professional misconduct required before disciplinary referral, and bare recital of a prima facie case was insufficient.

The Bar Council could refer an advocate to the Disciplinary Committee only if it formed a bona fide, objective and reasonable belief on the material before it that professional misconduct was disclosed. On the stated facts, the advocate acted as a coordinator and agent in a family arrangement, not as counsel, and no advocate-client relationship arose from the transaction. The allegations about facilitating signatures and dealing with the settlement deed did not, on that material, make out a prima facie case of misconduct as an advocate. A bare recital that such a case existed was insufficient where the underlying facts did not rationally support it, so the reference was quashed.

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Issues: Whether the Bar Council had applied its mind and had reason to believe that the petitioner advocate had committed professional misconduct so as to refer the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee.

Analysis: The notice could be sustained only if the Bar Council formed a bona fide, objective and reasonable belief on the materials before it that the petitioner, as an advocate, had been guilty of professional or other misconduct. On the admitted facts, the petitioner was associated with the family arrangement as a coordinator and agent, not as counsel, and there was no advocate-client relationship in the transaction. The allegations related to his role in facilitating signatures and dealing with the settlement deed, which did not, on the facts stated, disclose a prima facie case of misconduct as an advocate. The mere recital that a prima facie case existed was held insufficient where the underlying material did not rationally support that conclusion.

Conclusion: The reference to the Disciplinary Committee was quashed as the Bar Council had not formed the requisite reasoned belief of professional misconduct.

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