Acquittal appeal review is limited: a reasonable trial court view cannot be overturned just because another view is possible.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappreciate evidence, but interference is justified only where the trial court's view is perverse, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, demonstrably unsustainable, or wholly unreasonable. If the trial court has adopted a reasonable and plausible view, acquittal should not be disturbed merely because another view is possible. The presumption of innocence stands strengthened after acquittal, and where two reasonable views arise on the same evidence, the view favourable to the accused must prevail. The High Court interfered without finding perversity and acted only on the possibility of conviction, so the acquittal was to be restored.

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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal by reappreciating the evidence merely because another view on the record was possible.

Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court has power to review and reappreciate the evidence, but interference is warranted only when the trial court's view is perverse, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, demonstrably unsustainable, or wholly unreasonable. If the trial court has taken a reasonable and plausible view on the evidence, the acquittal should not be disturbed merely because a different view is possible. The presumption of innocence is strengthened by acquittal, and two reasonable views on the same evidence must result in adoption of the view favourable to the accused. The High Court did not record that the trial court's appreciation of evidence was perverse or unsupported by material, and it interfered only because conviction was also a possible view.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in reversing the acquittal on the mere possibility of another view, and the acquittal was required to be restored.

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