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Issues: (i) Whether the directive governing selection of the Director General of Police from among empanelled officers remained operative notwithstanding the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 2007 and the 2008 amendment rules; (ii) whether the Supreme Court's interim stay of the earlier judgment in Yadav suspended the binding force of the Prakash Singh directive; and (iii) whether the State possessed absolute discretion to appoint the Head of Police Force outside the mandated selection process.
Issue (i): Whether the directive governing selection of the Director General of Police from among empanelled officers remained operative notwithstanding the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 2007 and the 2008 amendment rules.
Analysis: The statutory regime specified the apex scale and stated that appointment to posts above the selection grade was to be made by selection on merit with due regard to seniority, but it did not prescribe the methodology or criteria for selecting the Head of Police Force. The Court held that the later rules merely identified the zone of consideration and did not alter, modify, or substitute the Supreme Court's directive requiring selection through empanelment by the Union Public Service Commission and final choice by the State from among the empanelled senior-most officers. The absence of prescribed criteria meant the constitutional directive continued to fill the normative gap.
Conclusion: The Prakash Singh directive remained operative and binding, and the appointment made without following it was unsustainable.
Issue (ii): Whether the Supreme Court's interim stay of the earlier judgment in Yadav suspended the binding force of the Prakash Singh directive.
Analysis: The Court held that a stay of operation does not erase the underlying judgment or the legal norms declared therein; it only suspends enforcement of the immediate consequences between the parties. Applying the settled distinction between quashing and staying an order, the Court concluded that the stay of Yadav did not nullify either the ratio of that judgment or the earlier binding directive in Prakash Singh. The principles of comity did not require the Tribunal or the High Court to decline adjudication in the absence of any interdiction by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The interim stay of Yadav did not suspend or eclipse the Prakash Singh directive, and the objection based on comity failed.
Issue (iii): Whether the State possessed absolute discretion to appoint the Head of Police Force outside the mandated selection process.
Analysis: The Court rejected the claim of uncanalized executive freedom, holding that constitutional government is a limited government and that discretion must operate within lawful bounds. Because the post of Head of Police Force was a cadre post in the Indian Police Service governed by central service rules and the binding directive governing selection, the State had no authority to ignore the prescribed process or substitute an in-house screening mechanism for the mandated UPSC-based empanelment process.
Conclusion: The State had no absolute discretion to make the appointment contrary to the binding selection framework.
Final Conclusion: The appointment was invalid, the challenge to the Tribunal's order failed, and the writ petitions were dismissed with directions for a fresh selection in accordance with the binding selection process.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the governing service rules prescribe only merit-based selection with due regard to seniority but leave the selection methodology unspecified, a prior binding constitutional directive on the appointment process continues to operate until displaced by a valid legislative or statutory prescription; a mere interim stay of an earlier judgment does not suspend that directive or enlarge executive discretion beyond law.