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Issues: (i) Whether the requirement of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause under Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 qualified the pleasure power in Section 240(1) and was mandatory. (ii) What was meant by the expression "the action proposed to be taken" in Section 240(3). (iii) Whether a dismissed civil servant could recover arrears of pay by action.
Issue (i): Whether the requirement of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause under Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 qualified the pleasure power in Section 240(1) and was mandatory.
Analysis: The statutory language in Section 240(3) was treated as a direct qualification on the general pleasure tenure in Section 240(1). The provision was in prohibitory form and stood on the same footing as the protection against dismissal by a subordinate authority. The earlier regime under Section 96B of the Government of India Act, 1919 and the disciplinary rules did not contain an equivalent statutory safeguard, but the 1935 Act elevated the safeguard into the statute itself.
Conclusion: Section 240(3) was mandatory and qualified the power under Section 240(1).
Issue (ii): What was meant by the expression "the action proposed to be taken" in Section 240(3).
Analysis: The relevant stage was not the initial framing of charges, but the point at which the authority had reached a definite conclusion on the charges and provisionally determined the punishment to follow. A civil servant had to be told that dismissal or reduction in rank was the punishment proposed on identified grounds and be given a reasonable opportunity to answer that proposed action. The statutory opportunity could arise at more than one stage, but it was distinct from the preliminary enquiry under the service rules.
Conclusion: The expression referred to the stage when dismissal or reduction had become the proposed punishment after findings on the charges.
Issue (iii): Whether a dismissed civil servant could recover arrears of pay by action.
Analysis: No contractual right to pay was shown in the covenant, and no statutory provision was identified that created an enforceable civil action for arrears of salary. The court held that a public servant's remuneration claim was subject to the implied public law qualification that such claims were not enforceable by ordinary civil action against the Crown.
Conclusion: The claim for arrears of pay by action failed.
Final Conclusion: The dismissal was set aside as void and inoperative for non-compliance with the statutory opportunity requirement, but the claim for arrears of pay was rejected.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute requires a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed, the authority must afford that opportunity only after it has definitively proposed the punishment, and a dismissal made without complying with that mandatory safeguard is void.