1939 (7) TMI 8 - HC - Customs

Court lacked jurisdiction under Specific Relief Act due to Government of India Act; Customs Authorities acted within statutory powers. Applicant's relief application dismissed for not exhausting remedies.

The Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act due to the prohibition under Section 106(2) of the ... - Issues Involved:1. Jurisdiction of the Court.2. Statutory duty of the Customs Authorities.3. Appropriateness of granting relief under Section 45, Specific Relief Act.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Jurisdiction of the Court:The primary issue to be determined was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court noted that under Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act, High Courts cannot exercise original jurisdiction in matters concerning revenue or acts done for the collection of revenue. The Court referenced various decisions, including Alcock Ashdown & Co. Ltd. v. The Chief Revenue Authority, where it was held that certain acts concerning judicial powers of Revenue Authorities did not fall within this prohibition. However, in this case, the Court concluded that the actions of the Customs Authorities were indeed related to the collection of revenue and thus fell within the prohibition of Section 106(2). Therefore, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to interfere in the matter.2. Statutory Duty of the Customs Authorities:The second issue was whether the Customs Authorities had failed to perform a statutory duty under the Sea Customs Act. The applicant argued that the Customs Authorities were obligated to proceed under Section 32 of the Sea Customs Act for the assessment and levy of duty. The Customs Authorities, however, contended that they were entitled to assess, levy, and detain goods under Section 87, irrespective of Section 32. The Court analyzed the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, noting that Sections 30, 31, and 32 provided specific procedures for appraisement and assessment of ad valorem goods, whereas Section 87 provided a general enabling power to assess. The Court concluded that Section 32 applied to a limited class of disputes involving discrepancies in value and that the Customs Authorities had the option to proceed under different sections depending on the nature of the goods (tariff value goods vs. ad valorem goods). The Court ultimately found that the Customs Authorities had not failed to perform a statutory duty as they had the discretion to proceed under Section 87.3. Appropriateness of Granting Relief under Section 45, Specific Relief Act:The third issue was whether relief under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act should be granted, assuming the Court had jurisdiction. The Court noted that the applicant had not exhausted his remedies under Sections 188 and 191 of the Sea Customs Act, which provided for an appeal process. The Court emphasized that it would not interfere by way of mandamus until the applicant had exhausted all available remedies. Additionally, the Court discussed the penal assessment made by the Customs Authorities, which involved increasing the duty by 50% and imposing a penalty. The Court found that such penal assessment was not warranted by any provision of the Act and that the Customs Authorities could only confiscate goods or impose penalties under Section 167. However, given the jurisdictional bar and the applicant's failure to exhaust remedies, the Court dismissed the application with costs.Conclusion:The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application due to the prohibition under Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act. The Customs Authorities were found to have acted within their statutory powers under Section 87 of the Sea Customs Act. The application for relief under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act was dismissed on the grounds that the applicant had not exhausted his remedies and the Court could not interfere in matters concerning revenue.