1962 (5) TMI 55 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court Reverses High Court Decision on Power of Attorney for Property Sale

C. Annacheriam and Ors. Versus Achotha Menon and Ors.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reversing the High Court's decision. It inferred that the power of attorney likely authorized the third defendant to ... - Issues Involved:1. Justification of the sale for Rs. 8,000/- when the debt was Rs. 5,250/-2. Alleged collusion between the first and third defendants3. Validity of the sale deed without the Karnavan's consent4. Delegation of Karnavan's powers to the Mukthiar5. Representation of minor plaintiffs by their mother instead of the Karnavan6. Defendants' understanding and consent to the sale deedIssue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Justification of the Sale for Rs. 8,000/-:The plaintiffs argued that the sale of the property for Rs. 8,000/- to satisfy a debt of Rs. 5,250/- was not justified, claiming the property's market value was around Rs. 40,000/-. However, the first defendant contended that the entire amount was necessary to discharge various debts binding on the tarwad and that the sale price was the prevailing market price. The trial court upheld the sale, finding it binding on the tarwad, while the High Court reversed this, not due to inadequacy of consideration but due to procedural issues.2. Alleged Collusion Between Defendants:The plaintiffs alleged collusion between the first defendant and the third defendant, who was the Mukthiar of the Karnavan. The first defendant countered this by asserting that the transaction was bona fide and necessary to discharge debts. The trial court did not find sufficient evidence of collusion, and this issue was not a primary focus in the appellate decision.3. Validity of the Sale Deed Without Karnavan's Consent:The plaintiffs argued that the sale deed was invalid without the Karnavan's consent. The High Court agreed, stating that the power of attorney did not effectively delegate the Karnavan's powers to the third defendant. The Supreme Court, however, inferred that the power of attorney likely allowed the third defendant to act with the consent of other adult members for family necessity, given the absence of the document and the history of unchallenged similar transactions.4. Delegation of Karnavan's Powers to the Mukthiar:The Supreme Court examined whether the delegation of the Karnavan's powers to the Mukthiar was valid. Citing precedents, the Court noted that while a Karnavan cannot delegate his entire office, he can delegate management powers, especially when absent, as long as the delegation is revocable. The Court inferred that the power of attorney allowed the third defendant to manage and alienate property with the consent of adult members, which was in line with family karar and necessary for the tarwad's interests.5. Representation of Minor Plaintiffs by Their Mother:The plaintiffs contended that the representation of the minor plaintiffs by their mother, instead of the Karnavan, rendered the sale deed null and void. The first defendant argued that the mother's representation was valid under the circumstances. The trial court did not find this representation invalid, and this issue did not significantly impact the appellate court's decision.6. Defendants' Understanding and Consent to the Sale Deed:The plaintiffs claimed that defendants 2, 4, and 5 did not fully understand the necessity of the transaction and were misled by the third defendant. The first defendant countered that all adult members had joined the sale deed, indicating their consent. The Supreme Court inferred that the adult members' participation in similar transactions without challenge suggested their understanding and consent.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reversing the High Court's decision. It inferred that the power of attorney likely authorized the third defendant to sell the property with the consent of adult members for family necessity. The Court emphasized the practical necessity of such delegation when the Karnavan is absent and upheld the validity of the sale deed. The appellants' costs were to be borne by the plaintiffs-respondents.