Directory form requirements and saving clauses upheld, preserving emergency control orders, delegated action, and pending prosecutions.

A formal requirement that an emergency control order be expressed as made by the Governor-General in Council was treated as directory, so the order remained valid where the substance of governmental action was otherwise clear. The business rules were read broadly enough to permit delegation for convenient transaction of executive business, so the challenge based on action by a single member failed. Saving provisions were construed to preserve the Special Tribunal's constitution, pending prosecutions, accrued liabilities, and prior operation of the emergency legislation after repeal or expiry, so the proceedings could continue.

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Issues: (i) whether the Iron and Steel (Control of Distribution) Order, 1941 was invalid for not being expressed to be made by the Governor-General in Council as required by the constitutional provision governing orders of the Central Government; (ii) whether the business rules authorised delegation to a single member for making the order; (iii) whether the Second Lahore Special Tribunal continued to exist and retained jurisdiction after the repeal and expiry of the emergency enactments and whether pending prosecutions could continue under the saving provisions.

Issue (i): whether the Iron and Steel (Control of Distribution) Order, 1941 was invalid for not being expressed to be made by the Governor-General in Council as required by the constitutional provision governing orders of the Central Government.

Analysis: The provision requiring orders to be expressed as made by the Governor-General in Council was treated as directory in context. It was construed as regulating the form in which an already made order was expressed, not as a condition precedent to validity. The structure of the section, the accompanying signature requirement, and the consequences of invalidating numerous emergency orders all supported that construction. In substance, the expression "Central Government" in the order was read as the equivalent of the Governor-General in Council.

Conclusion: The challenge to the validity of the Distribution Order failed.

Issue (ii): whether the business rules authorised delegation to a single member for making the order.

Analysis: The phrase "business in his Executive Council" was construed as referring to the business of the Governor-General in Council, and the rule-making power was held wide enough to permit rules for convenient transaction of such business. The suggested ultra vires objection to action by one member of the Council was rejected.

Conclusion: The delegation challenge failed.

Issue (iii): whether the Second Lahore Special Tribunal continued to exist and retained jurisdiction after the repeal and expiry of the emergency enactments and whether pending prosecutions could continue under the saving provisions.

Analysis: The Tribunal's constitution and allotment of cases were upheld as surviving the repeal of the amending ordinance and as not having lapsed merely because the emergency period ended. The temporary statute and related ordinances were construed with the aid of the saving provisions, which preserved prior operation, liabilities, and pending proceedings. The same approach was applied to the continuation of prosecutions under the Defence of India Act and the emergency legislation, and the Court held that the proceedings could validly continue.

Conclusion: The Tribunal remained competent, and the prosecutions were saved and could continue.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed in substance, all principal objections to the validity of the control orders, the tribunal's jurisdiction, and the continuation of the proceedings being rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory language and context show that a formal requirement regulates the mode of expression of an order rather than its existence, the provision is directory and substantial compliance is sufficient; saving clauses for temporary or emergency legislation preserve accrued liabilities and pending proceedings unless a contrary intention clearly appears.

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