Court-fee valuation turns on substance: declaratory relief needed to remove a title obstacle makes the injunction suit one with consequential relief.

For court-fee purposes, the plaint must be read by its substance: where an injunction cannot be granted unless an asserted title is first displaced, a declaration is not surplusage. A suit seeking declaration that a will is void together with injunction against interference is therefore treated as a declaratory suit with consequential relief under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The second proviso applies to the property component capable of valuation under Section 7(v), including immovable property and agricultural land, while a cash component may be valued separately by the plaintiff. The suit was consequently treated as undervalued for court-fee and jurisdiction.

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Issues: (i) whether the prayer for declaration was surplusage and the suit was in substance one for injunction only; (ii) whether the suit fell within Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as a suit for declaratory relief with consequential relief; (iii) whether the second proviso to Section 7(iv)(c) applied so as to require valuation of the property covered by the suit.

Issue (i): whether the prayer for declaration was surplusage and the suit was in substance one for injunction only.

Analysis: The plaint had to be construed on its substance and not merely its form. The plaintiffs did not assert possession and the defendants claimed title and possession on the basis of the alleged will. The injunction sought could not be granted unless the alleged will and the hostile title set up under it were first displaced. Where a legal obstacle must be removed before injunctive relief can be granted, a declaration is not surplusage.

Conclusion: The declaration was necessary and the suit was not a mere injunction suit.

Issue (ii): whether the suit fell within Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as a suit for declaratory relief with consequential relief.

Analysis: A consequential relief is one that follows directly from the declaration and cannot be claimed independently as a substantial relief. On the plaint as a whole, the declaration that the will was void and the injunction against interference were interlinked, because the injunction depended upon removal of the defendants' asserted title. The relief therefore answered the description of a suit for declaration where consequential relief is prayed.

Conclusion: The suit was governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

Issue (iii): whether the second proviso to Section 7(iv)(c) applied so as to require valuation of the property covered by the suit.

Analysis: The proviso applies where the relief sought is with reference to property capable of valuation under clause (v) of Section 7. The suit related substantially to immovable property and agricultural land, which had to be valued at market value, while the cash component was not within the proviso and could be valued by the plaintiffs. The proviso was therefore applicable to the property component, but not to the cash component.

Conclusion: The second proviso applied to the immovable property and agricultural land, while the cash component remained outside it.

Final Conclusion: The trial court rightly held that the suit was undervalued for court-fee and jurisdiction and correctly directed return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court.

Ratio Decidendi: In determining court-fee, the court must look to the substance of the plaint; where declaratory relief is required to remove a legal obstacle to injunction, the suit falls under Section 7(iv)(c), and the proviso to that clause applies to property relief capable of valuation under Section 7(v).

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