Writ jurisdiction survives where a trade notice is ultra vires, non-appealable, or issued in breach of natural justice.

The amended Article 226 did not bar writ jurisdiction where the impugned trade notice and consequential directions were prima facie without authority, not appealable under the Act, and issued without hearing. Article 226(3) was applied only when an adequate and efficacious remedy is specifically provided by the law governing the challenged action; a general civil suit or a futile challenge to a nullity is insufficient. The distinction between a real order and a purported order was material: actions ex facie without jurisdiction, contrary to statute, or in breach of natural justice may be treated as nullities and challenged directly in writ. The petitions therefore did not abate under the Forty-second Amendment provisions.

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Issues: Whether the petitions abated under the amended Article 226 and Section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 on the ground that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy and that the impugned trade notice and directions could be challenged only before the excise authorities.

Analysis: The amended Article 226 retained unrestricted jurisdiction for enforcement of fundamental rights under clause (a), while clauses (b) and (c) introduced a narrower field for redress of substantial injury or illegality causing substantial failure of justice. The fetter in Article 226(3) was held to apply only where an adequate and efficacious remedy is specifically provided by or under the law under which the impugned action is taken. A general civil suit or a futile remedy against a nullity does not satisfy that requirement. The Court treated the distinction between a real order and a purported order as material: where the action is ex facie without jurisdiction, contrary to the statute, or in breach of natural justice, the order is a nullity and need not be first pursued in appeal. The impugned trade notice and consequential directions were prima facie beyond the authority of the issuing officer, were not appealable under the Act, and threatened the petitioners' property rights and tax liability without hearing.

Conclusion: The petitions were not hit by Article 226(3) or Section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, and did not abate. The petitioners were entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction at that stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the amended Article 226, a writ petition is not barred by the existence of an alternative remedy where the impugned action is a nullity, ultra vires, or taken in breach of natural justice, or where the petition seeks enforcement of fundamental rights.

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