Special Judge jurisdiction upheld where direct charge-sheet filing after pardon did not violate Article 14 procedure.

Direct filing of a charge-sheet before the Special Judge after pardon was tendered to an accomplice did not divest the Special Judge of jurisdiction to take cognizance. The statutory scheme required examination of the approver at the relevant stages, but Section 337(2B) did not restrict the Special Judge's power under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The fact that the approver might be examined once if proceedings began before the Special Judge, or twice if they began before a Magistrate, was not a substantial or qualitative procedural difference. The availability of two procedural routes therefore did not, by itself, offend Article 14, and the direct cognizance procedure was upheld.

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Issues: Whether the filing of the charge-sheet directly before the Special Judge, after a pardon had been tendered to an accomplice and he had been examined under Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code, deprived the Special Judge of jurisdiction or made the procedure discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 337 required examination of the approver at the relevant stages of the proceeding, but nothing in Section 337(2B) indicated any limitation on the Special Judge's power to take cognizance under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The circumstance that the approver might be examined once if the case began before the Special Judge, or twice if it began before a Magistrate, was held not to create a substantial or qualitative difference in procedure. The Court held that the mere availability of two procedural routes does not by itself attract Article 14, and the different forum chosen by the prosecution did not render the procedure unconstitutional.

Conclusion: The contention was rejected and the Special Judge's jurisdiction to take cognizance directly was upheld.

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