Quasi-judicial consolidation powers require notice and hearing, and cannot unsettle completed proceedings after finalisation.

Section 36 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 was treated as part of agrarian reform and, on the stated constitutional challenge, was held protected by Article 31A rather than void under Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or 31. The power to vary or revoke a confirmed consolidation scheme was held quasi-judicial because it affected crystallised property rights, so prior notice and an opportunity of hearing were mandatory. By the majority, the words "at any time" were read as limited to the consolidation process and not as authority to unsettle completed consolidation after repartition, possession and the new record of rights had been prepared.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 36 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, was void as offending Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution, or stood protected by Article 31A; (ii) whether the power to vary or revoke a confirmed consolidation scheme under Section 36 was quasi-judicial and required notice and opportunity of hearing; (iii) whether the words "at any time" in Section 36 permitted exercise of the power after consolidation proceedings had concluded and possession and record of rights had been completed.

Issue (i): Whether Section 36 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, was void as offending Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution, or stood protected by Article 31A.

Analysis: The scheme of the Act was treated as one of agrarian reform directed to consolidation of holdings and prevention of fragmentation. The provision operated upon rights in an estate and involved modification or extinction of rights. The constitutional challenge based on Articles 14, 19 and 31 was met by Article 31A, which saves laws providing for acquisition, extinguishment or modification of rights in an estate. The Court held that the parent enactment, as amended, fell within the protection of that Article and was not rendered void on the stated constitutional grounds.

Conclusion: Section 36 was held not to be ultra vires on the ground of inconsistency with Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or 31, and the constitutional challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the power to vary or revoke a confirmed consolidation scheme under Section 36 was quasi-judicial and required notice and opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The power under Section 36 affected property and civil rights already crystallised under a confirmed scheme. The consolidation process itself contained adjudicatory features such as objections, confirmation, repartition and appeals, and the interference contemplated by Section 36 was therefore not a purely administrative act. In such a setting the rule of audi alteram partem applied, and silence in the statute could not be treated as an implied exclusion of notice and hearing where serious civil consequences followed.

Conclusion: The power under Section 36 was held to be quasi-judicial in character and it was mandatory to give prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before varying or revoking the scheme.

Issue (iii): Whether the words "at any time" in Section 36 permitted exercise of the power after consolidation proceedings had concluded and possession and record of rights had been completed.

Analysis: The majority read the phrase in the context of the Act as a whole and held that the power could not survive indefinitely. Once the scheme had been confirmed, repartition completed, possession delivered and the new record of rights prepared, the consolidation authorities became functus officio and further variation or revocation would defeat the object of finality underlying the statute. A contrary reading would leave title and possession in a state of perpetual uncertainty. One member agreed with the result but took the view that the words "at any time" were of wide amplitude and were not confined to the pre-repartition stage.

Conclusion: By the majority, the power under Section 36 was confined to the consolidation process and could not be exercised after completion of consolidation proceedings and preparation of the new record of rights; the separate opinion differed on this temporal construction but not on the final result.

Final Conclusion: The impugned proceedings under Section 36 were quashed because the authority acted without giving notice or hearing to the affected parties, and the appeals were allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power that affects confirmed property rights in consolidation proceedings is quasi-judicial, must be exercised with notice and hearing, and cannot be used to unsettle completed consolidation after the process has reached finality.

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