Requisition of immovable property is distinct from acquisition, and an ultra vires order may be restrained under specific relief principles.

Requisition of immovable property was treated as distinct from compulsory acquisition, so the Central Legislature could not support the impugned rule without a notification under the residual-power provision; the enactment was therefore ultra vires. The requisition order was construed as affecting only the premises and fittings, not the business goodwill, but it was still invalid because it exceeded the statutory power and violated the mandatory requirement to interfere with property as little as possible. Relief under the Specific Relief Act was held maintainable against the public officer, as the duty could be enforced by a restraint order notwithstanding delegated authority and the availability of a general suit.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Central Legislature had competence, in the absence of a notification under the residual-power provision, to enact the rule authorising requisition of immovable property; (ii) whether the requisition order was invalid for want of authority, for dealing with the business goodwill, or for contravention of the statutory command to interfere with property as little as possible; and (iii) whether relief could be granted against the public officer under the Specific Relief Act.

Issue (i): Whether the Central Legislature had competence, in the absence of a notification under the residual-power provision, to enact the rule authorising requisition of immovable property.

Analysis: The power of the Federal Legislature under the Government of India Act was confined to matters in the legislative lists, though plenary within that sphere. Requisition of immovable property was held to be distinct from compulsory acquisition of land and not fairly comprehended within the relevant entries for land or rights in or over land. The Court treated the distinction between acquisition, which transfers proprietary rights, and requisition, which confers only temporary use and possession, as decisive. In the absence of a notification under the residual-power provision, the impugned enactment could not be supported by the general legislative entries.

Conclusion: The enactment authorising requisition of immovable property was ultra vires the Central Legislature.

Issue (ii): Whether the requisition order was invalid for want of authority, for dealing with the business goodwill, or for contravention of the statutory command to interfere with property as little as possible.

Analysis: The order was construed as requisitioning only the premises and fittings, not the goodwill or the business undertaking as such. The Court held that the goodwill might suffer as a consequence of requisition, but that did not convert the order into one requisitioning goodwill. The challenge based on alleged discrimination also failed. On the statutory command to interfere with property as little as possible, the Court treated the obligation as mandatory and held that an order made in abuse of the power, or in excess of it, was not protected merely because the statute barred questioning of orders made in exercise of the power.

Conclusion: The order was not invalid on the ground that it requisitioned goodwill, but it was invalid as being an abuse of power and as contravening the statutory limitation on interference with property.

Issue (iii): Whether relief could be granted against the public officer under the Specific Relief Act.

Analysis: The Court held that the public-duty provision was wide enough to reach duties arising under the general law as well as statute, and that a specific declaration was not necessary before seeking an order to forbear. The existence of a general suit was not treated as an equally convenient and effectual remedy in the circumstances. The fact that the respondent acted under delegated authority for the Government did not defeat the petition, because the order was directed against the officer in his public capacity and not as a claim against the Crown.

Conclusion: Relief under the Specific Relief Act was maintainable against the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to restraining relief against enforcement of the requisition order, and the challenge to the requisitioning power succeeded on competence and abuse-of-power grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Requisition of immovable property is legally distinct from compulsory acquisition, and a public officer may be restrained from acting on an order that is ultra vires or made in abuse of a mandatory statutory power, even where the statute restricts judicial challenge to orders made in exercise of that power.

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