Natural justice and objective eligibility criteria governed citizenship refusal; ouster clause could not bar review of a void decision.

A statutory power affecting citizenship had to be exercised consistently with natural justice: the applicant was entitled to notice of the proposed refusal and a reasonable opportunity to answer it, and a refusal made without that hearing was a nullity. The residual public-policy words in the proviso to section 7 were inconsistent with the Constitution because they left eligibility to the Minister's subjective satisfaction rather than objective criteria, and were therefore void. An ouster clause could not shield a decision made without jurisdiction, so judicial review remained available. As valid statutory grounds were not excluded on the record, the proper relief was reconsideration according to law, not immediate registration.

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Issues: (i) Whether the applicant for citizenship was entitled to a hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice before refusal of registration; (ii) whether the residual public-policy words in the proviso to section 7 were inconsistent with the Constitution and void; (iii) whether the ouster clause in section 16 barred judicial inquiry into the Minister's decision; and (iv) whether the declaration should be that the application was entitled to reconsideration according to law rather than an immediate declaration of entitlement to registration.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant for citizenship was entitled to a hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice before refusal of registration.

Analysis: The statutory scheme conferred on the Minister authority to determine an application affecting individual rights. That authority had to be exercised consistently with the principles of natural justice. At minimum, the applicant had to be informed of the grounds of proposed refusal and given a reasonable opportunity to answer them. A decision reached without such opportunity was outside jurisdiction and a nullity.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to a fair hearing before refusal, and the Minister's decision was null and void for breach of natural justice.

Issue (ii): Whether the residual public-policy words in the proviso to section 7 were inconsistent with the Constitution and void.

Analysis: The Constitution permitted only such exceptions or qualifications to the right of registration as were provided by or under legislation. Those exceptions had to be stated with sufficient clarity and objective content so that eligibility could be determined by ascertainable criteria, not left to unstructured executive discretion. The impugned words left the matter to the Minister's subjective satisfaction on an undefined public-policy basis and thereby displaced the constitutional right itself.

Conclusion: The residual words in the proviso were inconsistent with the Constitution and void.

Issue (iii): Whether the ouster clause in section 16 barred judicial inquiry into the Minister's decision.

Analysis: An ouster clause could not protect a purported decision made without jurisdiction. A determination reached in breach of natural justice, or on a basis beyond lawful power, was not a valid decision within the statute. Judicial supervision remained available to test whether the Minister had acted within jurisdiction and lawfully.

Conclusion: Section 16 did not bar judicial review or inquiry into the validity of the Minister's decision.

Issue (iv): Whether the declaration should be that the application was entitled to reconsideration according to law rather than an immediate declaration of entitlement to registration.

Analysis: Although the applicant had shown that the refusal was invalid, the record did not establish with certainty that no valid statutory ground under paragraphs (a) to (e) could exist. The court therefore declined to convert the invalid refusal into an immediate substantive declaration of entitlement to registration. The proper course was to restore the Minister's lawful jurisdiction to decide the application afresh, on proper notice and on relevant evidential material.

Conclusion: The proper declaration was one for reconsideration according to law, not an outright declaration of entitlement to registration.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent of varying the form of relief, but the applicant obtained substantive success because the refusal was set aside, the offending statutory words were struck down, and the application had to be reconsidered lawfully.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power affecting rights must be exercised in accordance with natural justice, and an ouster clause cannot shield a purported decision that is ultra vires or made without jurisdiction; where constitutional eligibility is qualified by legislation, the qualifying criteria must be objective and not left to unguided executive discretion.

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