Tariff determination under the Electricity Act does not create an implied right of oral hearing for objectors before the State Commission.

Under section 64 of the Electricity Act, 2003, objectors to retail tariff determination have no independent right to an oral hearing before the State Commission where the statute and regulations contemplate publication of the tariff application, written objections, and consideration of those objections in the prescribed manner. The tariff process is quasi-judicial, but natural justice is shaped by the statutory scheme; here, the availability of written objections and a statutory appeal under section 111 meant that oral hearing could not be implied for objectors. A bank guarantee given for interim protection did not create any special procedural entitlement. The direction requiring oral hearing was therefore unsustainable, and the Commission was to decide the tariff application on written objections in accordance with law.

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Issues: Whether consumers are entitled to an oral hearing before the State Commission at the stage of determination of retail tariff under section 64 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and whether such a hearing could be claimed on equitable grounds because the writ petitioners had been directed to furnish bank guarantee.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under section 64 provides for publication of the tariff application, receipt and consideration of suggestions and objections from the public, and passing of a tariff order. The regulations framed by the State Commission require such objections to be made in writing, and contemplate oral hearing only in the manner specifically provided by the regulations. The tariff-determination process is quasi-judicial, but the content of natural justice depends on the statutory framework, the nature of the enquiry, and the absence or presence of demonstrated prejudice. Since the scheme permits written objections, reserves oral hearing for the applicant-licensee if rejection is proposed, and provides a statutory appeal under section 111 with hearing on facts and law, no independent right of oral hearing can be read into the provision for objectors. The direction to furnish bank guarantee was only a condition for interim protection and did not confer any special procedural entitlement.

Conclusion: The objectors had no right to oral hearing before the State Commission, and the bank guarantee condition did not justify such a hearing; the direction granting oral hearing was therefore not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded to the extent that the impugned directions requiring oral hearing were modified, while the State Commission was required to decide the tariff application after considering the written objections in accordance with law.

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