Limitation applies to Official Liquidator's challenge to lease transactions under company law, making the application time-barred.

An application by the Official Liquidator to cancel a lease deed and recover possession was held to be governed by the Limitation Act, subject only to exclusion of time under Section 458A of the Companies Act, 1956. Although the lease fell within Section 531-A of the Companies Act, it was not a nullity in absolute terms and had to be avoided through proper legal proceedings. Even after applying the full statutory exclusion, the application was found to be time-barred. The Liquidator's receipt of rent was also inconsistent with the contention that the lease was wholly void.

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Issues: Whether the Official Liquidator's application to cancel the lease deed and recover possession was barred by limitation, and whether the transaction could be avoided without being hit by the Limitation Act.

Analysis: The lease deed was a transaction falling within the scope of Section 531-A of the Companies Act, 1956, but such a transaction is not a nullity in the absolute sense and must still be avoided through appropriate legal proceedings by the Official Liquidator. The Court held that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to such an application, subject only to the exclusion of time available under Section 458A of the Companies Act, 1956. Even after granting the full statutory exclusion, the application was found to have been filed beyond time. The Court also noted that the Official Liquidator was receiving rent under the lease, which was inconsistent with the plea that the lease was wholly void.

Conclusion: The application was barred by limitation and was liable to be dismissed. The result was against the Official Liquidator and in favour of the respondent.

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