Directory time-limit under food adulteration rules did not defeat prosecution absent proof of prejudice to the accused.

Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules was treated as a procedural prescription governing an earlier stage of prosecution, and the Court applied the settled test of purpose, subject-matter, and consequence of non-compliance to hold it directory rather than mandatory. Non-observance of the time-limit did not by itself invalidate the public analyst report or bar prosecution; the accused had to show prejudice, especially impairment of the statutory right under Section 13(2). Mere delay, without proof of such prejudice, was insufficient, so the prosecution remained valid.

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Issues: Whether Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is mandatory or directory, and whether non-compliance with the time-limit by itself invalidates the prosecution.

Analysis: The rule was held to govern an earlier stage of the prosecution process, before institution of the case in court. The Court applied the settled distinction between mandatory and directory prescriptions, emphasising that the purpose, subject-matter, and consequences of non-compliance are decisive. The time-limit was treated as a procedural requirement intended to expedite the public analyst process, not as one that automatically voids the report or bars prosecution. Reliance was placed on the principle that prejudice must be shown, particularly where the accused's statutory right under Section 13(2) is affected. Mere delay, without proof that the accused was deprived of that right or otherwise prejudiced, was insufficient.

Conclusion: Rule 7(3) is directory and not mandatory, and non-compliance with it is not fatal unless prejudice is established. The appeal failed.

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