1994 (1) TMI 307 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court: Rule 7(3) of Food Adulteration Rules Directory, Not Mandatory. Delay Not Prejudicial. Appeal Dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is directory, not mandatory. The Court found that the delay in ... - Issues Involved1. Whether Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is mandatory or directory.2. Compliance with Rule 9(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.3. Prejudice to the accused due to the delay in receiving the Analyst's report.Detailed Analysis1. Whether Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is mandatory or directoryThe primary issue in this case is whether Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is mandatory or merely directory. The appellant argued that Rule 7(3) is mandatory, citing several High Court decisions that supported this view. The rule, as it stood at the relevant time, required the Public Analyst to deliver the report within 45 days from the date of receipt of any sample for analysis.The Supreme Court reviewed various judgments from different High Courts. Some judgments, like those from the Madras, Maharashtra, Punjab, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Kerala High Courts, held that Rule 7(3) is mandatory. Conversely, other judgments, including those from the Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Kerala High Courts, held that Rule 7(3) is directory.The Court referred to authoritative texts on statutory interpretation, such as Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and Craies' Statute Law, to distinguish between mandatory and directory provisions. The Court emphasized that the purpose and object of the statute must be considered, and whether non-compliance would result in injustice or inconvenience to others.The Court concluded that Rule 7(3) is procedural and intended to expedite the process of investigation. It held that the rule is directory, not mandatory. The Court reasoned that a slight delay in receiving the Analyst's report does not render the report void or inadmissible, provided the delay does not prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial.2. Compliance with Rule 9(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration RulesThe trial court had also observed that Rule 9(a) was not properly complied with. The High Court, while confirming the acquittal of the manufacturer (A-2), held that Rule 9(a) is not mandatory but directory, following the Supreme Court's judgment in Tulsiram v. State of M.P.The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view, noting that Rule 9(a) is intended to ensure prompt action by the authorities but is not mandatory. The Court emphasized that non-compliance with Rule 9(a) would only be significant if it caused prejudice to the accused.3. Prejudice to the accused due to the delay in receiving the Analyst's reportThe Supreme Court addressed the issue of prejudice to the accused due to the delay in receiving the Analyst's report. The appellant argued that the delay violated his rights under Section 13(2) of the Act, which allows the accused to request analysis of the sample by the Central Food Laboratory within 10 days of receiving the Public Analyst's report.The Court noted that mere delay in receiving the report does not automatically result in prejudice. The Court emphasized that prejudice must be proven, and the delay must have caused the sample to become unfit for analysis, thereby denying the accused the right to challenge the Public Analyst's report.The Court referred to its previous judgment in Dalchand v. Municipal Corpn., Bhopal, which held that Rule 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, requiring the report to be supplied within ten days, is directory. The Court applied the same reasoning to Rule 7(3), concluding that non-compliance with the rule is not fatal unless it results in prejudice to the accused.ConclusionThe Supreme Court held that Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is directory and not mandatory. The Court found no merit in the appellant's contention that the delay in receiving the Analyst's report was fatal to the prosecution case. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence of the appellant (A-1) were upheld.