Writ interference in special-statute prosecutions is limited where applicability is debatable and statutory remedies exist.

The Supreme Court reiterated that Article 226 writ jurisdiction should not be used to quash a prosecution under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 unless the accusation, even on its face, cannot constitute an offence under the special Act. Because the applicability of the statute was debatable and the Act provided an express appellate remedy, the accused had to pursue the statutory forum rather than seek merits review in writ proceedings. The Court also held that the chargesheet was not confined to recovery of arms alone: the surrounding allegations of concealment, association with other accused, and smuggling conspiracy could attract the special Act, so the High Court's contrary view was unsustainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the prosecution under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. (ii) Whether the allegations in the chargesheet disclosed only offences under the Arms Act or also attracted the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the prosecution under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

Analysis: The writ jurisdiction could be exercised only in the rarest cases where the accusation, even if accepted at face value, ex facie could not constitute an offence under the special Act. Where the matter presented a debatable question on applicability of the statute, the accused had to pursue the statutory procedure before the Designated Court and then the appeal provided under the Act. In the presence of an express appellate remedy under Section 19 of the Act, the High Court should not have undertaken a merits review of the Designated Court's view on applicability of the Act.

Conclusion: The High Court had no justification to quash the prosecution under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (ii): Whether the allegations in the chargesheet disclosed only offences under the Arms Act or also attracted the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

Analysis: The Court held that the accusation was not confined to the bare recovery of rifles and magazines. The surrounding allegations, including concealment of arms, association with other accused, and the alleged smuggling conspiracy, required appreciation of evidence at trial. At that stage, it could not be said that the case was limited only to offences under the Arms Act or that the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 was inapplicable on the face of the record.

Conclusion: The allegations were capable of attracting the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and the High Court's contrary view was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's order quashing the proceedings was set aside, and the prosecution under the special Act was directed to continue before the Designated Court.

Ratio Decidendi: The High Court should not invoke Article 226 to quash a special-statute prosecution where applicability of the statute is debatable and an express statutory appeal exists; such questions must ordinarily be determined by the designated forum and tested through the statutory appellate remedy.

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