Seizure for limitation purposes depends on legal possession and control, so the section 132(5) orders were held within time.

Orders under section 132(5) were not time-barred because the ninety-day period was computed from the date the Income-tax Officer with jurisdiction took legal possession and control of the seized assets under the Income-tax Act, not from the earlier physical taking of custody elsewhere. The High Court held that seizure for limitation purposes is not confined to the moment of first physical custody, and authorities dealing with seizure under the Code of Criminal Procedure were inapplicable. On that basis, the impugned orders were found to be within time and valid, and the limitation challenge was rejected.

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Issues: Whether the orders under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were time-barred because they were passed beyond ninety days from the date of seizure.

Analysis: The decisive question was when the seizure occurred for the purpose of computing the ninety-day period. The Court held that seizure in law did not necessarily depend on the moment of physical taking of custody by the authority first acting at another place. Since the assets were seized under the Income-tax Act and later came into the possession and control of the Income-tax Officer having jurisdiction, the relevant date was when that officer took possession for action under the Act. On that basis, the authorities relied on by the petitioners, which concerned seizure under the Code of Criminal Procedure, were held inapplicable. The Court applied the principle that legal possession and control may constitute seizure for the statutory purpose of limitation.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were within ninety days from the date of seizure and were valid; the contention that they were time-barred was rejected.

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