Execution sale challenges require proof of substantial injury; procedural amendments to Order XXI Rule 90 apply to later applications.

Section 104(2) did not bar the special appeal because the court's special appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent and Rules of Court was preserved; the preliminary objection was rejected. Clause (b) of the proviso to Order XXI Rule 90 applied to applications made after its commencement, even in pending execution matters, because the right to challenge a sale arises only after the auction sale, and the deposit or security requirement was upheld as procedural and within the rule-making power. The applicant could object to the sale, but setting it aside required proof of substantial injury caused by irregularity or fraud. As no substantial injury was established, the challenge to the auction sale failed.

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Issues: (i) whether the special appeal was barred by Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure despite the Court's special appellate jurisdiction; (ii) whether clause (b) of the proviso to Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied to the appellant's application and was within the rule-making power of the Court; and (iii) whether the appellant's application to set aside the sale was maintainable on the grounds of locus standi and substantial injury.

Issue (i): whether the special appeal was barred by Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure despite the Court's special appellate jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 104(2) was held not to take away the special appellate jurisdiction preserved by Section 4, because the special appeal was traced to the Court's special jurisdiction under the Letters Patent and the Rules of Court. The bar against a further appeal under Section 104(2) was treated as insufficient to override that special jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The special appeal was maintainable and the preliminary objection was rejected.

Issue (ii): whether clause (b) of the proviso to Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied to the appellant's application and was within the rule-making power of the Court.

Analysis: Clause (b) was treated as procedural and applicable to applications made after its commencement, even in execution proceedings initiated earlier. The right to challenge the sale was held to arise only after the auction sale, so no vested right to proceed under the earlier form of the rule existed. The requirement of deposit or security was also held to be a matter relating to procedure within Sections 122 and 128, and not beyond the rule-making power.

Conclusion: Clause (b) applied to the application and was valid.

Issue (iii): whether the appellant's application to set aside the sale was maintainable on the grounds of locus standi and substantial injury.

Analysis: The appellant was held entitled to object to the sale because the decree-holder had himself proceeded on the footing that the appellant had an interest in the properties. However, a sale under Order XXI Rule 90 could not be set aside unless substantial injury caused by the irregularity or fraud was proved. On the evidence, the sale price was not shown to be inadequate and no substantial injury was established. The alleged infirmities were not treated as illegalities rendering the sale void.

Conclusion: The application was not sustainable for want of proof of substantial injury.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the auction sale failed, and the dismissal of the application for setting aside the sale was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural amendment regulating applications to set aside a sale in execution applies to applications made after its commencement, and an auction sale cannot be set aside under Order XXI Rule 90 unless substantial injury caused by the alleged irregularity or fraud is proved.

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