Non-party appeal and civil injunction limits: BIFR could not ignore a subsisting restraint, and recusal barred re-participation.

A non-party cannot pursue an appeal against an injunction order without leave of the appellate court when it is not yet on record, so the challenge to the injunction was not maintainable. An operative civil court injunction restraining proceedings before BIFR could not be ignored by the tribunal on its own view that the order was void; until set aside or vacated, it remained binding, and the BIFR proceedings were treated as stayed and of no legal consequence. Where a Member had earlier recused himself, his return to the same matter raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, so further participation was disallowed.

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Issues: (i) Whether an appeal against an injunction order is maintainable at the instance of a non-party without leave of the appellate court; (ii) whether the civil court's injunction against proceedings before the BIFR could be ignored, and whether the BIFR retained jurisdiction after the company's net worth was said to have become positive; (iii) whether the participation of a Member of the BIFR after prior recusal vitiated the subsequent proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal against an injunction order is maintainable at the instance of a non-party without leave of the appellate court.

Analysis: The right of appeal is statutory and may be exercised by a person not formally on record only with leave of the appellate court if he is bound by, aggrieved by, or prejudicially affected by the order. Here, the appellant had not obtained leave and was not yet impleaded in the suit. In that situation, the objection to jurisdiction could not be entertained in appeal at his instance.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable in its present form and the challenge to the injunction order was not examined on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the civil court's injunction against proceedings before the BIFR could be ignored, and whether the BIFR retained jurisdiction after the company's net worth was said to have become positive.

Analysis: The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is a special enactment with a remedial object, but the exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is not lightly inferred. A civil court has inherent power to decide its own jurisdiction, and an order of a competent civil court cannot be disregarded by a tribunal on the unilateral premise that it is coram non judice. Until vacated or set aside in proper proceedings, the injunction remained operative. On the facts, the BIFR ought not to have proceeded in defiance of that order. The court also held that the proceedings before the BIFR had continued for an inordinate period and that the interim civil restraint did not, in the circumstances, justify the continued BIFR action being treated as legally effective.

Conclusion: The proceedings before the BIFR from 13 May 2013 were held to be stayed and of no legal consequence.

Issue (iii): Whether the participation of a Member of the BIFR after prior recusal vitiated the subsequent proceedings.

Analysis: Once a Member had recused himself on the footing of prior interaction with the parties, the apprehension of bias could not be dismissed. The governing test is the litigant's reasonable apprehension, and justice must also appear to be done. Reappearance of the recused Member in the same matter was therefore inappropriate.

Conclusion: The recused Member was directed not to participate further in the proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed for want of maintainability, while the writ petitions succeeded to the extent that the BIFR proceedings were restrained and the recused Member was excluded from further participation.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal cannot ignore an operative civil court injunction by declaring it void on its own, and a recused decision-maker should not re-enter the matter where a reasonable apprehension of bias would arise.

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