Governor's suspension power cannot override the Supreme Court's control over surrender and sentence while a criminal matter is pending.

Where a criminal matter is already before the Supreme Court, the Court's power to control the proceeding, including surrender, bail and suspension of sentence, prevails in that overlapping field. The Governor's clemency power under Article 161 is wide, but it cannot be used to suspend sentence for the same period when the case is sub judice before the Court; Order XXI, Rule 5 operates as the procedural basis for insisting on surrender unless the Court grants exemption. On that reasoning, the petitioner was not entitled to avoid surrender on the strength of a gubernatorial suspension order. A dissent took the view that Articles 161 and 142 operate in distinct fields and that the Governor's power remained available.

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Issues: Whether the Governor's power under Article 161 of the Constitution could suspend the sentence during the pendency of a special leave petition before the Supreme Court so as to exempt the petitioner from surrender under the Supreme Court Rules.

Analysis: The majority held that Article 161 and Article 142 both operate in the field of suspension of sentence, but only in a limited overlapping area. The Court held that where the matter is already sub judice before the Supreme Court, the Court's power to control the case, including surrender, bail, and suspension of sentence, must prevail in that field. The Governor's power under Article 161 is wide, but it cannot be exercised so as to operate in the same field at the same time as the Court's power under Article 142. Order XXI, Rule 5 was treated as the procedural expression of the Court's authority to insist on surrender unless exempted by the Court itself.

Conclusion: The Governor had no power to suspend the sentence for the period during which the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, and the petitioner was not entitled to exemption from surrender on that basis.

Dissenting Opinion: J.L. Kapur, J. held that Articles 161 and 142 operate in distinct fields, that the Governor's clemency power is plenary and exercisable at any time, and that the petitioner's surrender could be dispensed with because the Governor's suspension order was valid even during the pendency of proceedings in the Supreme Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Supreme Court is seized of a criminal matter, the Governor's power under Article 161 cannot be exercised to suspend the sentence for the same period, because the overlapping field must be resolved by harmonious construction in favour of the Court's power under Article 142.

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