Administrative revisional power under income tax law is not amenable to certiorari, and stay of recovery remains discretionary.

Penalty proceedings were upheld where the demand notice quantified the penalty, stated the default, and the record showed a prior order to levy penalty; service by affixture at the business premises was accepted as sufficient when personal service on the managing director failed. An order under section 33A was treated as administrative revisional action, not a judicial or quasi-judicial determination, so certiorari under article 226 was unavailable. The Income Tax Officer was also entitled to treat the assessee as a defaulter despite a pending appeal, because the statute gave only discretionary power to stay collection and no absolute right to suspension of recovery.

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Issues: (i) Whether the levy of penalty was invalid for want of a prior formal order and proper service of the demand notice; (ii) whether an order passed by the Commissioner under section 33A of the Income-tax Act was administrative and therefore not amenable to certiorari under article 226; (iii) whether the Income Tax Officer was unjustified in treating the assessee as a defaulter while an appeal was pending.

Issue (i): Whether the levy of penalty was invalid for want of a prior formal order and proper service of the demand notice.

Analysis: The notice of demand quantified the penalty and stated the reason for its levy, namely failure to pay tax within the time allowed. The departmental notice followed the prescribed form and the record showed that an order had in fact been made to levy penalty. As to service, personal service on the managing director having failed, service by affixture at the business premises was resorted to. That mode of service was treated as sufficient compliance with the rules governing service on a corporation, and the circumstances were unlike a case where affixture would be a mere ritual.

Conclusion: The levy of penalty was not invalid on either ground.

Issue (ii): Whether an order passed by the Commissioner under section 33A of the Income-tax Act was administrative and therefore not amenable to certiorari under article 226.

Analysis: The statutory scheme showed that section 33A created an administrative revisional mechanism for correcting departmental action. Unlike provisions conferring quasi-judicial power, it contained no hearing requirement comparable to section 33B and no appellate structure attached to the Commissioner's revisional act. The absence of such indicia, together with the Privy Council authority treating the provision as administrative machinery, led to the conclusion that the Commissioner was not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power.

Conclusion: The Commissioner's order under section 33A was administrative and was not liable to be quashed by certiorari.

Issue (iii): Whether the Income Tax Officer was unjustified in treating the assessee as a defaulter while an appeal was pending.

Analysis: Section 45 of the Income-tax Act vested discretion in the Income Tax Officer to stay collection, but it did not confer an absolute right on the assessee merely because an appeal had been filed. The assessee had not paid even the admitted liability despite repeated opportunities and permission to pay by instalments. In those circumstances the officer's decision to proceed against the assessee as a defaulter could not be characterised as arbitrary or capricious.

Conclusion: The assessee had no right to insist on a stay, and the default treatment was justified.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions could not be sustained, and the appeals succeeded, restoring the departmental action and the levy of penalties.

Ratio Decidendi: A revisional order under section 33A of the Income-tax Act is administrative in character, and where the statute confers only discretionary relief in tax collection, the assessee cannot claim certiorari or an absolute stay as of right.

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