Reassessment notices for war-year income were sustained because the express "at any time" wording excluded import of a separate time-limit.

Section 34(1)(a), as amended, expressly authorised notice for escaped income at any time, so the reassessment notices for the war years were not barred by the outer limit in section 34(1A). Section 34(1A) was a special enabling provision for war-year income and did not make the time-limit applicable to section 34(1)(a); the court refused to import a restriction the legislature had not expressed. The challenge to the notices therefore failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether notices issued for the assessment years 1940-41 to 1946-47 were governed by section 34(1A) of the Indian Income-tax Act so as to be barred by the outer limit of 31 March 1956; (ii) Whether the outer limit in section 34(1A) had to be read into section 34(1)(a) for war-year assessments.

Issue (i): Whether notices issued for the assessment years 1940-41 to 1946-47 were governed by section 34(1A) of the Indian Income-tax Act so as to be barred by the outer limit of 31 March 1956.

Analysis: Section 34(1A) was introduced as an enabling provision to deal with escaped income of the war years after the ordinary period under section 34(1)(a) had expired. The two provisions were not simultaneously operative over the same field in a way that made section 34(1A) the exclusive provision for war-year cases. After the 1956 amendment, section 34(1)(a) expressly permitted notice to be issued at any time in cases where the statutory conditions were satisfied.

Conclusion: The notices did not fail merely because they were issued after 31 March 1956, and they were validly referable to section 34(1)(a).

Issue (ii): Whether the outer limit in section 34(1A) had to be read into section 34(1)(a) for war-year assessments.

Analysis: The language of section 34(1)(a), as amended, was explicit that notice could be issued at any time. There was no conflict requiring the court to import the time-limit from section 34(1A). The retention of section 34(1A), and the later amendments to sections 34(1B) and 34(4), did not justify reading into section 34(1)(a) a restriction which the legislature had not expressed. The cited authorities were distinguished because they concerned provisions where the statute was silent on time, unlike section 34(1)(a).

Conclusion: The outer limit in section 34(1A) could not be imported into section 34(1)(a).

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the reassessment notices failed, and the writ petition was dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing provision expressly authorises action at any time, a time-limit contained in a separate special provision cannot be imported into it unless the statute clearly so provides.

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