Court Upholds Suspension Order as Interim Measure

The court upheld the legality of the suspension order dated 14th August 1967, determining it as a valid interim measure pending a departmental enquiry, not a penalty. Allegations of mala fides against respondent No. 2 were dismissed due to lack of concrete evidence. The court clarified that the Financial Commissioner had jurisdiction to order suspension pending enquiry, distinguishing it from suspension as a penalty. The argument of violating departmental instructions regarding suspension was rejected, as subsequent instructions allowed suspension before serving a charge-sheet in suitable cases. The petition was dismissed without costs.

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Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the suspension order dated 14th August 1967.
2. Allegations of mala fides against respondent No. 2.
3. Jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner to order suspension.
4. Violation of departmental instructions regarding suspension.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the suspension order dated 14th August 1967:
The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the suspension order dated 14th August 1967, pending a departmental enquiry. The court examined the facts and found that the petitioner was suspended pending a departmental enquiry based on allegations of irregularities in the allotment of evacuee properties. The court noted that the suspension was an interim measure pending the enquiry and not a penalty. The court referred to Rule 12, which lists penalties, and clarified that suspension pending enquiry is not a penalty but an ad interim step. The court concluded that the suspension order was legally valid and did not warrant interference.

2. Allegations of mala fides against respondent No. 2:
The petitioner alleged that respondent No. 2 was maliciously disposed towards him and that the suspension order was a result of personal vendetta. The court emphasized that allegations of mala fides must be substantiated with concrete evidence. It highlighted that the petitioner had not provided sufficient material to prove prejudice or ill-will on the part of respondent No. 2. The court observed that the petitioner had made reckless allegations without factual basis and noted that the presumption is that officials discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the law. The court found no merit in the allegations of mala fides and dismissed them as baseless.

3. Jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner to order suspension:
The petitioner contended that only the Commissioner, Ambala Division, was the competent authority to order suspension under the Punjab Tehsildari Rules, 1952. The court clarified that the distinction between suspension by way of punishment and suspension pending enquiry is crucial. The court explained that Appendix A of the Tehsildari Rules relates to suspension as a penalty, while the suspension in this case was pending enquiry. The court further noted that the Financial Commissioner, as the appointing authority, had the power to suspend under Section 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act (1898). The court concluded that the Financial Commissioner had the jurisdiction to order the suspension and dismissed the petitioner's contention.

4. Violation of departmental instructions regarding suspension:
The petitioner argued that the suspension order violated departmental instructions dated 21st April 1961, which required a charge-sheet to be served before suspension. The court referred to subsequent instructions dated 8th August 1963, which allowed suspension before serving a charge-sheet in suitable cases. The court emphasized that these instructions were regulatory and not mandatory, and their breach did not justify the issuance of a writ. The court cited precedents to support its position that executive instructions do not have the force of statutory rules. The court found no merit in the argument that the suspension order violated departmental instructions and dismissed this contention as well.

Conclusion:
The court found no merit in any of the arguments advanced by the petitioner. The allegations of mala fides were unsubstantiated, the Financial Commissioner had the jurisdiction to order suspension, and the suspension order did not violate any mandatory departmental instructions. Consequently, the petition was dismissed without any order as to costs.

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