2012 (9) TMI 1139 - AT - Income Tax

Appeal partially allowed, case remanded for clarification on interest under Section 234D.

The appeal was partially allowed with the case remanded to the Assessing Officer for clarification on the charging of interest under Section 234D. The ... - 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED - Whether interest under Section 234D is chargeable where a refund has been granted by way of an appellate order of the Commissioner (Appeals) rather than under sub-section (1) of Section 143. - Whether interest under Section 234D is chargeable where an appellate grant of refund is subsequently reversed by the Tribunal, or only where the refund originally granted under Section 143(1) is reduced or held not to be due on regular assessment. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Applicability of Section 234D where refund was granted by Commissioner (Appeals) rather than under Section 143(1) - Legal framework: Section 234D prescribes simple interest where 'any refund is granted to the assessee under sub-section (1) of section 143' and either (a) no refund is due on regular assessment or (b) the amount refunded under Section 143(1) exceeds the amount refundable on regular assessment; subsection (2) reduces interest where an order under specified sections holds the refund granted under Section 143(1) to be correctly allowed. Explanations treat certain assessments as 'regular assessment' for the section's purposes. - Precedent Treatment: The Court did not rely on or refer to any prior judicial authority; the analysis proceeds from statutory text and the facts before the Tribunal. - Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reads the threshold phrase 'where any refund is granted to the assessee under sub-section (1) of section 143' as the statutory hook for liability under Section 234D. If a refund is not the product of Section 143(1) but instead arises from an appellate order (CIT(A)), the precondition for applying Section 234D is absent. The Court contrasts refunds granted by the assessing officer under Section 143(1) with refunds ordered by an appellate authority, and concludes the latter do not fall within the scope of Section 234D's triggering provision. - Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Section 234D applies only where the refund was granted under Section 143(1); refunds granted by appellate order are not within the section's triggering language. - Conclusion: Interest under Section 234D is not chargeable as a matter of law where the refund was granted by virtue of an order of the Commissioner (Appeals) rather than under Section 143(1). Issue 2: Effect of subsequent reversal of an appellate refund by the Tribunal on liability under Section 234D - Legal framework: Section 234D(1) contemplates interest from the date of grant of refund to the date of regular assessment where a refund earlier granted under Section 143(1) is not due or is in excess; subsection (2) contemplates reduction of interest where certain orders hold the amount of refund granted under Section 143(1) to be correctly allowed. Explanation addresses first-time assessments under Sections 147/153A. - Precedent Treatment: No prior decisions were invoked to govern the interaction between appellate reversal and Section 234D liability; the Tribunal applied statutory construction to the factual record. - Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observes that the statutory scheme targets refunds originally granted under Section 143(1). Where a refund was granted by an appellate order (CIT(A)) and later reversed by the Tribunal, the statutory language of Section 234D does not expressly create liability for such a sequence. The Court thus distinguishes between (a) refund granted under Section 143(1) and later reduced on regular assessment and (b) refund resulting from appellate grant subsequently reversed - only the former squarely fits Section 234D's text. Because the record did not clearly disclose whether the refund was originally granted under Section 143(1) or was an appellate grant, the Tribunal found a factual lacuna requiring remand for verification by the Assessing Officer. - Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Reversal of an appellate grant does not, without more, bring the case within Section 234D; the statutory trigger is a refund granted under Section 143(1). Obiter - The Court's instruction that factual verification is required where the origin of the refund is unclear (i.e., whether it arose under Section 143(1) or from an appellate order) is a procedural guidance grounded in the case facts. - Conclusion: Where the source of the refund is unclear, the matter must be remitted to the Assessing Officer for factual determination; if the refund was by appellate order and not under Section 143(1), Section 234D interest should not be levied. The Assessing Officer must afford the assessee adequate opportunity to be heard when readjudicating liability. Remand and procedural disposition (ancillary to issues above) - The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities on the point of Section 234D and remitted the issue to the Assessing Officer for factual verification and readjudication consistent with the statutory construction stated above. - The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee in the remand proceedings. Cross-reference - See Issue 1 and Issue 2 for the Court's unified conclusion that the statutory precondition 'refund ... under sub-section (1) of section 143' is decisive; where the factual record does not establish that precondition, the AO must determine the origin of the refund before charging Section 234D interest.