Civil court scrutiny of widow's adoption remains open despite statutory confirmation where the statute does not expressly bar challenge.

A statutory confirmation of a widow's adoption under the third proviso to section 23 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation, 1877 did not, by itself, make the adoption immune from civil scrutiny. Section 119 barred impeachment of acts, orders, or decisions of the Central Government, but the majority held that this bar did not extend to antecedent questions about the validity of the adoption itself, nor to matters outside what the Government was empowered to determine. The civil court could therefore examine the adoption's validity, while any succession claim under section 24 remained subject to the statute's conditions.

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Issues: Whether a suit challenging the validity of a widow's adoption, after confirmation by the Central Government under the third proviso to section 23 of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation, 1877, was barred by section 119 and outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

Analysis: The substantive part of section 23 governed succession where there was male issue by birth or adoption, and the third proviso imposed an additional condition that an adoption by a widow would not be deemed valid until confirmed by the Central Government. The confirmation order protected the governmental act of confirmation, but it did not, by itself, make the adoption immune from all civil challenge. Section 119 barred impeachment of what had been done, ordered, or decided by the Central Government, but it did not extend to matters antecedent to confirmation where the validity of the adoption itself was in issue. The second limb of section 119 also did not apply because the suit did not seek an order which the Central Government was empowered to make or pronounce. The majority therefore held that the Civil Court could examine the validity of the adoption, though a separate claim depending on succession under section 24 would have to satisfy the statutory conditions attached to that section.

Conclusion: The suit, so far as it challenged the validity of the adoption, was not barred by sections 23 and 119 and was maintainable before the Civil Court.

Dissenting Opinion: S.K. Das, J. held that the confirmation under the third proviso necessarily involved determination of the widow's power to adopt and the factum of adoption, and that section 119 therefore barred any civil suit challenging the adoption. On that view, the appeal ought to have been allowed and the suit dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the maintainability of the civil suit on the principal issue of challenge to the adoption, notwithstanding the dissenting view that the suit was barred.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory confirmation of a widow's adoption does not, in the absence of clear words, conclusively exclude civil court scrutiny of the adoption's validity; a bar on impeaching governmental confirmation does not automatically extend to antecedent matters unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication so provides.

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