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Issues: (i) Whether the amendment to Entry 2 of the Second Schedule and Explanation 1 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, fixing tax at the third point of sale for liquor sold by FL-2 and FL-3 licensees, was unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether the amendment was invalid because the State ought to have proceeded by rules under Section 80 instead of amending the Second Schedule under Section 86(1); (iii) Whether the levy amounted to impermissible double taxation or tax on tax.
Issue (i): Whether the amendment to Entry 2 of the Second Schedule and Explanation 1 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, fixing tax at the third point of sale for liquor sold by FL-2 and FL-3 licensees, was unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The classification was upheld on the basis that TASMAC's second sale and the petitioners' third sale were not comparable, the petitioners were a distinct class of hotel and club licensees selling at a higher price with value additions, and the customers served by them were different from TASMAC's retail customers. In liquor trade, Article 19(1)(g) protection is limited, and the State is entitled to regulate and classify for revenue and welfare purposes. The amendment was introduced to remove an anomaly and augment revenue, and the Court found no arbitrariness or hostile discrimination.
Conclusion: The challenge under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) failed and the classification was held valid.
Issue (ii): Whether the amendment was invalid because the State ought to have proceeded by rules under Section 80 instead of amending the Second Schedule under Section 86(1).
Analysis: Section 3(5) authorises levy of tax on goods specified in the Second Schedule at the point and rate prescribed there, and Section 86(1) expressly empowers amendment of the Schedules by notification. Section 80 is only a rule-making provision to give effect to the Act and does not curtail the substantive power to amend the Schedule. The absence of rule-making did not render the statutory amendment impermissible.
Conclusion: The challenge based on Section 80 was rejected and the amendment under Section 86(1) was held competent.
Issue (iii): Whether the levy amounted to impermissible double taxation or tax on tax.
Analysis: The Court held that the impugned levy operated on the petitioners' third-sale turnover under the amended Schedule and did not constitute a separate levy on an already taxed component in the manner alleged. The petitioners' claim of set-off could not be extended to the third sale merely because they had benefited at the second point of sale, and no repugnancy between the provisions was found.
Conclusion: The plea of double taxation or tax on tax was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The impugned amendment was sustained as a valid revenue measure within legislative power, and all the writ petitions were dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: A taxing classification based on distinct sale points and economically different classes is valid if it has a rational nexus with the revenue object, and a statutory power expressly conferred to amend a schedule may be exercised without framing rules where rules are not made a condition precedent.